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71 
DISMANTLING THE PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT OF THE 
PRIVACY ACT OF 1974: DOE V. CHAO 
Haeji Hong, Esq.* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
What if our government released your social security number and 
your name to strangers without your consent? 
Would you be outraged? 
Would you feel violated? 
Would you demand some type of remedy? 
The social security number is one of the most valuable types of 
personal information that Americans possess in today’s society.  The 
ubiquitous nine-digit number ties each person to private, personal 
information such as his or her medical and insurance coverage, credit 
history, and governmental benefits and privileges such as a driver’s 
license.1  In this information age, Americans’ greatest concern is the loss 
of privacy.2  Disclosure of valuable personal information such as the 
social security number to strangers without the holder’s consent is a 
 
* J.D. from UC Davis in 1998.  Currently clerking for Justice Harold F. See, Jr. of the Alabama 
Supreme Court.  I would like to thank my family, Jongjoo Hong, Sunuk Hong, and Miji Hong for 
their support.  I would also like to thank my friends, Julie R. Tuan, esq., James S. Kwon, esq., Chun 
T. Wright, esq., and John Palmerkern, esq.  Their comments to this article, as well as their support, 
were invaluable. 
 1. Preserving the Integrity of Social Security Numbers and Preventing Their Misuse by 
Terrorists and Identity Thieves: Joint Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Social Security of the 
Comm. on Ways and Means and the Subcomm. on Immigration, Border Security, and Claims of the 
House Comm. on the Judicary, 107th Cong. 11 (2002) (statement of James B. Lockart III, Deputy 
Commissioner of Social Security); UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, SOCIAL 
SECURITY NUMBERS: GOVERNMENT BENEFITS FROM SSN USE BUT COULD PROVIDE BETTER 
SAFEGUARDS, GAO-02-352 at 2 (2002) [hereinafter GAO-02-352] (discussing the extent of 
government agencies’ use of social security numbers), available at 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d02352.pdf (last visited Oct. 7, 2004). 
 2. See Gerald F. Seib, Privacy Politics: Bush Maneuvers to the Right Spot, WALL ST. J., June 
27, 2001, available at 2001 WL-WSJ 2867878 (stating that the loss of personal privacy was the 
greatest concern among Americans according to a Wall St. Journal/NBC News poll). 
1
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significant violation of privacy and may cause real, significant harm.  If 
the government made such a disclosure, reasonably, one would expect 
some type of remedy or compensation. 
The Supreme Court disagreed.  A divided Supreme Court recently 
decided in Doe v. Chao3 that the federal government’s disclosure of the 
social security number, while constituting a violation of the Privacy Act 
of 1974 (the “Privacy Act”), was not enough to compensate the victim.4  
After examining the civil remedy section of the Privacy Act, the 
Supreme Court ruled that the victim must also prove that he sustained 
actual damages before recovering the statutory minimum damage of 
$1,000.5  This latest decision will greatly affect the enforcement of the 
Privacy Act by private citizens and reduce the effectiveness of the 
already much criticized Privacy Act.6 
Congress enacted the Privacy Act to prevent the federal 
government from violating privacy rights of American citizens.7  
Changing technology, i.e. computers, facilitated the government’s 
collection and dissemination of private information and instigated 
 
 3. Doe v. Chao, 124 S. Ct. 1204 (2004). 
 4. See id. at 1206 and 1212 (holding that individuals adversely affected by a federal agency’s 
violation of the Privacy Act of 1974 must prove actual damage to obtain the statutory award of 
$1,000). 
 5. See id. at 1207-08. 
 6. PRIVACY PROT. STUDY COMM’N, PERSONAL PRIVACY IN AN INFORMATION SOCIETY 8 
(1977) [hereinafter PERSONAL PRIVACY]; Steven A. Bercu, Toward Universal Surveillance in an 
Information Age Economy: Can We Handle Treasury’s New Police Technology?, 34 JURIMETRICS 
J. 383, 425-26 (1994) (explaining that the Privacy Act’s ineffectiveness stems from limited 
oversight, problems of the “routine use” exception, and general exemption for law enforcement 
agencies allow law enforcement network of FinCEN to operate relatively freely); William S. Challis 
& Ann Cavoukian, The Case for a U.S. Privacy Commissioner: A Canadian Commissioner’s 
Perspective, 19 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 1, 9 (2000) (stating the Privacy Act’s 
shortcomings include inconsistent application of privacy rules and lack of oversight and 
enforcement); Todd Robert Coles, Comment, Does the Privacy Act of 1974 Protect Your Right to 
Privacy?  An Examination of the Routine Use Exemption, 40 AM. U. L. REV. 957, 1000-01 (1991) 
(discussing the inadequacy of the civil remedies and barriers to access the courts); Paul M. 
Schwartz, Privacy and Participation: Personal Information and Public Sector Regulation in the 
United States, 80 IOWA L. REV. 553, 584-92 (1995) (criticizing the Privacy Act regarding the 
“routine use” exemption, computer matching, and transparency of data use).  This article focuses 
only on the civil remedy provision of the Privacy Act.  The Privacy Act has been heavily criticized 
regarding its scope, or lack thereof, in general, and many question whether the Privacy Act grants 
effective rights to individuals.  This article does not endeavor to address the perceived structural 
flaws and limited scope of the Privacy Act.  Instead, this article solely focuses on the civil remedy 
provision of the Privacy Act and its function as an effective enforcement mechanism of the rights 
set forth in the Privacy Act in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Doe v. Chao. 
 7. S. REP. NO. 93-1183, at 4-10 (1974), reprinted in JOINT COMM. ON GOV’T OPERATIONS, 
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE PRIVACY ACT OF 1974: SOURCE BOOK ON PRIVACY, at 157-163 
(1976) [hereinafter SOURCEBOOK]; H.R. REP. NO. 93-1416, at 2-10 (1974), reprinted in 
SOURCEBOOK, at 295-303.  Coles, supra note 6, at 957-58. 
2
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congressional and executive concern for individual privacy.8  To protect 
against a new, rising privacy threat, the Privacy Act empowered 
individuals to safeguard personal information in several ways.9  
Individuals can (1) determine what personal information has been 
collected by a federal agency,10 (2) verify the accuracy of such 
information,11 (3) request corrections and amendments of inaccurate 
information,12 and (4) request administrative review or bring a civil 
lawsuit.13  In order to effectuate the Privacy Act, Congress expected 
private citizens to enforce the Privacy Act by bringing civil actions 
against the government.14  Private enforcement of the Privacy Act could 
theoretically force governmental agencies to respect individuals’ privacy 
and to adhere to the Privacy Act’s mandate.15 
This article argues that the Supreme Court’s latest decision will 
effectively eradicate the only meaningful enforcement mechanism of the 
Privacy Act.  Part II examines the history of the right to privacy and the 
legislative background to the Privacy Act.16  Part III reviews the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Doe v. Chao.17  Part IV analyzes the 
Supreme Court’s decision and explains the detrimental repercussions of 
Doe v. Chao.18  Finally, this article concludes by proposing legislative 
changes to the Privacy Act so that privacy rights can be enforced 
effectively.19 
II.  BACKGROUND 
By the time Congress enacted the Privacy Act, the right to privacy 
was firmly entrenched in American legal rubrics.  Most legal scholars 
 
 8. S. REP. NO. 93-1183, supra note 7, at 10, reprinted in SOURCEBOOK, supra note 7, at 163; 
H.R. REP. NO. 93-1416, supra note 7, at 4, reprinted in SOURCEBOOK, supra note 7, at 297. 
 9. 5 U.S.C. § 552a. 
 10. Id. § 552a(d)(1). 
 11. Id. § 552a(d)(2). 
 12. Id. § 552a(d)(3). 
 13. Id. § 552a(g)(1). 
 14. See infra notes 238-240 and accompanying text (discussing how Congress expected 
widespread private enforcement of the Privacy Act). 
 15. See infra notes 234-237 and accompanying text (discussing how private enforcement has 
been low).  See also Coles, supra note 6, at 1000 (stating that incentives to bring a suit must be 
increased for effective private enforcement).  As explained in footnote 6 of this article, this article 
does not attempt to address the issue of structural flaws and limited scope of the rights in the 
Privacy Act.  See supra note 6 (explaining that this article does not attempt to address whether the 
Privacy Act is effective overall). 
 16. See infra Part II. 
 17. See infra Part III. 
 18. See infra Part IV. 
 19. See infra Part IV.D. 
3
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point to the seminal Harvard law review article, “The Right to Privacy” 
by Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis, as the beginning of the 
right to privacy.20  Warren and Brandeis declared the right to privacy as 
the “right to be let alone”21 and “the principle . . . of an inviolate 
personality.”22  Interestingly enough, the cause of Warren and Brandeis’ 
proclamation of the right to privacy was the rise of new technology and 
people’s abuse of such technology.  More specifically, the media’s 
exploitations of the “sacred precincts of private and domestic life” with 
cameras and other mechanical devices perturbed Warren and Brandeis.23  
Such new acts of unethical behavior compelled Warren and Brandeis to 
eloquently articulate the existence of privacy rights.24  Since then, 
technological innovations have prompted and shaped a parallel 
development of the right to privacy in common law and constitutional 
law to protect individuals against unanticipated intrusions.25  The newest 
technological advancement — computers — pushed Congress into 
action in 1974, resulting in the passage of the Privacy Act.26 
A.  Development of the Right to Privacy 
1.  Privacy Torts 
The common law doctrine of the right to privacy began after an 
initial rejection of Warren and Brandeis’ theory of the existence of one’s 
right to privacy.27  A public uproar followed a denial by the Court of 
 
 20. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 
(1890); See Patricia Mell, Seeking Shade in a Land of Perpetual Sunlight: Privacy as Property in 
the Electronic Wilderness, 11 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1, 29-30 (1996) (discussing how although 
Warren and Brandeis did not first pronounce the right to privacy, they were first to recognize 
privacy as property and personal right); William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383, 384 
(1960) (stating that Warren and Brandeis instigated a long line of law review discussions regarding 
the right to privacy). 
 21. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 20, at 193. 
 22. Id. at 205. 
 23. Prosser, supra note 20, at 383; Warren & Brandeis, supra note 20, at 195. 
 24. Prosser, supra note 20, at 383; Ken Gormley, One Hundred Years of Privacy, 1992 WIS. 
L. REV. 1335, 1348-52 (1992). 
 25. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33-34 (2001) (stating how the advance of 
technology affects the degree of privacy secured by the Fourth Amendment); see generally 
Gormley, supra note 24 (discussing privacy in the historical context with changing technology); 
Mell, supra note 20, at 12-13 (discussing history of technological innovation and how development 
of privacy right rose to counteract erosion of privacy caused by technological innovation). 
 26. 120 CONG. REC. 36,891 (1974) (remarks of Sen. Ervin), reprinted in SOURCEBOOK, supra 
note 7, at 769-70. 
 27. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 850 (W. Page 
Keeton ed., 5th ed. 1984); Roberson v. Rochester Folding-Box Co., 171 N.Y. 538, 64 N.E. 442, 
4
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Appeals of New York in Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co. to 
recognize the right to privacy when a person’s picture was used for 
advertisement without consent.28  As a response, the New York 
legislature enacted a statute to create criminal and civil remedies against 
the use of any person’s name or picture without his consent for 
advertisement.29  Subsequently, in a similar case of misuse of an 
individual’s name and picture, the Georgia Supreme Court repudiated 
the New York court’s decision and embraced the right to privacy set 
forth by Warren and Brandeis in Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co.30  
A number of states followed Georgia’s lead and the right to privacy 
gained firm authority and recognition in the First Restatement of Torts.31 
Today, a majority of states recognize the existence of the common 
law right to privacy. 32  According to Dean William L. Prosser33 and the 
Second Restatement of Torts,34 there are four forms of privacy 
intrusions.  The right to privacy is invaded if one: (1) unreasonably 
intrudes upon an individual’s seclusion;35 (2) appropriates an 
individual’s name or likeness;36 (3) unreasonably publicizes an 
individual’s private life;37 or (4) unreasonably publicizes an individual to 
place him or her in a false light before the public.38 
According to the Second Restatement of Torts, a violation of the 
right to privacy entitles a person to recover damages for: “(a) the harm to 
his interest in privacy resulting from the invasion; (b) his mental distress 
proved to have been suffered if it is of a kind that normally results from 
such an invasion; and (c) special damage of which the invasion is a legal 
 
544-556 (1902). 
 28. KEETON, supra note 27, at 850. 
 29. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1903, ch. 132, §§ 1-2, amended by N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW, §§ 50-51 
(McKinney 1909); KEETON, supra note 27, at 850-51.  It is both a misdemeanor and a tort to “make 
use of the name, portrait or picture of any person for ‘advertising purposes or for the purposes of 
trade’ without his written consent.”  KEETON, supra note 27, at 850-51. 
 30. Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 190, 216-222, 50 S.E. 68, 79-81 (1905); 
KEETON, supra note 27, at 851. 
 31. KEETON, supra note 27, at 851. 
 32. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A reporter’s note (1977). 
 33. Prosser, supra note 20, at 389; Susan E. Gindin, Lost and Found in Cyberspace: 
Informational Privacy in the Age of the Internet, 34 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1153, 1188-89 (1997). 
 34. RESTATEMENT, supra note 32, §§ 652A-652I; Gindin, supra note 33, at 1188-89. 
 35. RESTATEMENT, supra note 32, §§ 652A(2)(a), 652B. 
 36. Id. §§ 652A(2)(b), 652C. 
 37. Id. §§ 652A(2)(c), 652D. 
 38. Id. §§ 652A(2)(d), 652E.  But see Jerry Kang, Information Privacy in Cyberspace 
Transactions, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1193, 1202-03 (1998) (categorizing privacy in different “clusters” 
by physical space, ability to make decisions, and flow of information). 
5
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cause.”39  One can recover damages for emotional distress, personal 
humiliation, and non-pecuniary loss if he proves actual harm.40  The 
Second Restatement of Torts also postulates that damages may have to 
be proven and cannot be presumed for the privacy violations involving 
unreasonable publicity,41 given the Supreme Court’s decision regarding 
damages in a similar tort law, defamation law.42 
2.  Constitutional Rights to Privacy 
The right to privacy is not an explicitly enumerated constitutional 
right.  Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has upheld the right to privacy 
as a constitutionally protected right in various cases.43  The initial 
constitutional right to privacy arose in the context of birth control.44  
Once the Court articulated the constitutional right to privacy, the Court 
expanded the right to privacy in other contexts as well.45  Although the 
Supreme Court has not yet decided on whether informational privacy is 
constitutionally protected, the Court may decide such privacy is 
warranted given today’s technology. 
a.  Fundamental Privacy Rights 
The Supreme Court first pronounced the constitutional right to 
privacy in Griswold v. State of Connecticut. 46  Griswold involved a 
 
 39. RESTATEMENT, supra note 32, § 652H. 
 40. Id. § 652H cmt. b and c. 
 41. Id. § 652H cmt. c. 
 42. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 349-50 (1974) (holding that recovery for 
defamation must be for actual injury and cannot be for presumed or punitive damage when liability 
is not based on a showing of knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth). 
 43. See Griswold v. State of Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484-86 (1965) (finding that state birth 
control law violated constitutional right to marital privacy); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-54 
(1973) (finding that the prohibition of abortion violated constitutional right to privacy regarding 
abortion decisions, but that this right was not unqualified); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353, 
359 (1967) (finding that the Fourth Amendment protects individuals against unreasonable searches 
and seizures or unauthorized electronic surveillance); Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33-34, 40 
(2001) (finding that privacy secured by the Fourth Amendment changes with the advance of 
technology and that the unauthorized thermal imaging of home violated the expectations of privacy 
guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment); see also Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 605 (1977) 
(discussing in dicta the threat to privacy in the collection of personal information in computerized 
data banks). 
 44. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485-86. 
 45. See Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 33-34, 40 (holding that the unauthorized thermal imaging of the 
home violated the right to privacy guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment); Katz, 389 U.S. at 353, 
359 (holding that unauthorized electronic surveillance violated the right to privacy). 
 46. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
6
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Connecticut statute that prohibited the use of any birth control.47  
Although the right to privacy was not explicitly enumerated in the Bill of 
Rights, the Supreme Court clearly wanted to justify the constitutionality 
of marital privacy.48  The Court was openly disgusted by the idea that 
the state could search private marital bedrooms for violations of the 
statute at issue.49  To breathe life into the right to privacy, the Court 
examined various Bill of Rights cases.  The Court observed that in many 
cases, certain associational rights emanated from the Bill of Rights but 
were not explicitly mentioned in the Bill of Rights.50  Likewise, the 
Court found that zones of privacy can and do exist from the emanations 
of the guarantees in the penumbras of the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and 
Ninth Amendments.51 
Subsequently, the Supreme Court addressed the constitutional right 
to privacy again in Roe v. Wade.52  In Roe, the Court addressed whether 
a Texas anti-abortion statute violated a woman’s right to privacy.53  The 
Court once again acknowledged that the right to privacy is not explicitly 
protected by the Constitution, but reiterated the constitutionality of the 
right of personal privacy. 54  In examining past cases, the Court found 
that the right of personal privacy includes only rights that can be deemed 
“fundamental” or “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,” and 
generally relates to activities associated with marriage.55  Thus, the 
Court struck down the Texas anti-abortion law and found that a 
woman’s decision to terminate a pregnancy is within the right of 
personal privacy.56 
 
 47. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 480.  The defendants and appellants gave information and advice to 
a married couple on the use of contraceptives.  Id.  They were found guilty as accessories under 
Section 54-196 of the General Statutes of Connecticut (1958 rev.) that allows criminal charges to be 
brought against those who assist another to commit any offense.  Id. 
 48. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485-86.  The Supreme Court declared that marital privacy was “a 
right to privacy older than the Bill of Rights.”  Id. at 486. 
 49. Id. at 485-86. 
 50. Id. at  482-83.  For example, the freedom of association is not explicitly guaranteed by the 
First Amendment but is protected as a peripheral First Amendment right.  Id. at 483. 
 51. Id. at 484; see also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973). 
 52. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 53. Id. at 117-19. 
 54. Id. at 152. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. at 154, 162-64.  However, a woman’s right to have an abortion is not absolute and is 
balanced against the state’s interest in protecting the woman’s health and the potential human life.  
Id.  at 162-63. 
7
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b.  The Fourth Amendment and Privacy Rights 
Having established the constitutionality of the fundamental right to 
privacy, the Supreme Court turned to the Fourth Amendment to further 
develop privacy rights in other contexts.57  The Fourth Amendment 
prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures58 and protects individuals’ 
privacy from governmental intrusion.59  As advanced technology 
heightened the government’s surveillance capabilities, the Supreme 
Court faced cases on whether privacy rights should be adjusted 
accordingly.60  Two notable cases are Olmstead v. United States61 and 
Katz v. United States.62 
The Supreme Court initially ruled that wire tapping a telephone line 
was not a search or seizure that required a warrant in Olmstead v. United 
States.63  Noting that previous search and seizure cases dealt with 
physical invasions, the Court reasoned that telephone lines that extend 
beyond a home were outside the scope of Fourth Amendment 
protection.64  Justice Brandeis, in his famous dissent, argued that the 
interpretation of the Fourth Amendment must adapt with technology and 
that Fourth Amendment privacy violations can occur without physical 
seizures.65 
Thirty-nine years later, the Supreme Court adopted Justice 
Brandeis’ view and overruled Olmstead in Katz v. United States.66  In 
Katz v. United States, law enforcement used advanced electronic 
equipment to eavesdrop and record telephone conversations conducted 
in a public telephone booth by the petitioner.67  The Court found that 
such electronic surveillance violated privacy rights and protections 
afforded by the Fourth Amendment.68  Instead of focusing on whether a 
 
 57. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
 58. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.  The Fourth Amendment provides “[t]he right of the people to be 
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall 
not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be 
seized.”  Id. 
 59. Gindin, supra note 33, at 1185. 
 60. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967); Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 
(1928), overruled in party by Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
 61. 277 U.S. 438 (1928). 
 62. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
 63. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 466. 
 64. Id. at 464-66. 
 65. Id. at 477-78 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
 66. Katz, 389 U.S. at 353. 
 67. Id. at 348. 
 68. Id. at 353. 
8
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physical trespass occurred, the initial inquiry should focus on whether 
both an actual and reasonable expectation of privacy existed.69  
Furthermore, the Court clarified that the Fourth Amendment “protects 
people, not places . . . [,and what a person] seeks to preserve as private, 
even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally 
protected.”70 
B.  Informational Privacy 
Technological advances are not intrinsically evil.  Unfortunately, 
people abuse technological advances by finding new means to invade on 
one’s privacy.  Therefore, such occasions create new interests for which 
privacy protection is necessary.  Today, the computer’s ability to amass 
vast amounts of information has created a “market” in which personal 
information is a traded commodity.71  However, the computer’s 
concomitant ability to rapidly collect and disseminate personal 
information raises privacy concerns.72  The Supreme Court has not yet 
addressed whether informational privacy should also receive 
constitutional protection.  However, the Supreme Court in Whalen v. 
Roe acknowledged that individuals may have privacy interests in 
personal information.73 
Whalen involved a New York statute that required doctors to 
forward copies of patients’ records regarding the prescription of certain 
drugs to the state so that the state could maintain a centralized computer 
file.74  Although the statute prohibited the public disclosure of the 
patients’ identity, patients and physicians initiated the lawsuit to protect 
the privacy of patient information.75  The Supreme Court upheld the 
constitutionality of the statute, holding that two types of privacy 
interests, disclosure of personal information and independence in 
decisional ability, were not impaired.76  However, the Court noted that it 
was aware of threats to privacy created by unnecessary accumulation of 
personal information by the government in computer data banks and the 
unwarranted disclosure of such accumulated private information.77 
 
 69. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 70. Id. at 351. 
 71. See Francis S. Chlapowski, Note, The Constitutional Protection of Informational Privacy, 
71 B.U. L. REV. 133, 158-59 (1991); Mell, supra note 20, at 12-13. 
 72. Chlapowski, supra note 71, at 133, 158. 
 73. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 605 (1977). 
 74. Id. at 591, 593-95. 
 75. Id. at 594-95. 
 76. Id. at 598-604. 
 77. Id. at 605-06.  The Supreme Court stated: 
9
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Privacy torts and the constitutional right to privacy have developed 
on an ad-hoc basis in various contexts over time.78  While the Supreme 
Court may address the need for constitutional protection of 
informational privacy,79 without the right case, the Supreme Court may 
never decide the issue.80  To remove some of the uncertainty, Congress 
enacted the Privacy Act to address concerns regarding the federal 
government’s invasion of individuals’ privacy.81 
C.  The Privacy Act 
During the 1970’s, the public grew alarmed over the federal 
government’s increasing use of computers to collect, maintain, and use 
personal information.82  In response, Congress passed the Privacy Act.  
 
A final word about issues we have not decided.  We are not unaware of the threat to 
privacy implicit in the accumulation of vast amounts of personal information in 
computerized data banks or other massive government files.  The collection of taxes, the 
distribution of welfare and social security benefits, the supervision of public health, the 
direction of our Armed Forces, and the enforcement of the criminal laws all require the 
orderly preservation of great quantities of information, much of which is personal in 
character and potentially embarrassing or harmful if disclosed.  The right to collect and 
use such data for public purposes is typically accompanied by a concomitant statutory or 
regulatory duty to avoid unwarranted disclosures.  Recognizing that in some 
circumstances that duty arguably has its roots in the Constitution, nevertheless New 
York’s statutory scheme, and its implementing administrative procedures, evidence a 
proper concern with, and protection of, the individual’s interest in privacy.  We therefore 
need not, and do not, decide any question which might be presented by the unwarranted 
disclosure of accumulated private data - whether intentional or unintentional - or by a 
system that did not contain comparable security provisions.  We simply hold that this 
record does not establish an invasion of any right or liberty protected by the Fourteenth 
Amendment. 
Id. 
 78. See supra note 27-77 and accompanying text; Frederick Z. Lodge, Note, Damages Under 
the Privacy Act of 1974: Compensation and Deterrence, 52 FORDHAM L. REV. 611, 613-14, 617-18 
(1984). 
 79. The Supreme Court recently noted that the right to privacy guaranteed by the Fourth 
Amendment must adapt with the technological advances.  Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33-
34 (2001). 
 80. Lodge, supra note 78, at 618 (noting uncertainty in the scope of right to privacy). 
 81. S. REP. NO. 93-1183, supra note 7, at 1, 6, reprinted in SOURCEBOOK, supra note 7, at 
154, 159; 120 CONG. REC. 36,902-03 (1974) (remarks by Sen. Jackson), reprinted in SOURCEBOOK, 
supra note 7, at 800; Lodge, supra note 78, at 618.  Congress found that it must act to protect 
individuals’ privacy by regulating the federal agencies’ use of personal information.  The Privacy 
Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-579, § 2(A)(5), 88 Stat. 1896 (1974). 
 82. S. REP. NO. 93-1183, supra note 7, at 1, 6, 11, reprinted in SOURCEBOOK, supra note 7, at 
154, 159, 164; 120 CONG. REC. 36,893-94 (1974) (remarks by Sen. Percy), reprinted in 
SOURCEBOOK, supra note 7, at 776-78; id. at 36,900-03 (remarks by Sen. Nelson and Sen. Jackson), 
reprinted in SOURCEBOOK, supra note 7, at 794-801.  Congress found that the privacy of individuals 
was affected by federal agencies’ accumulation and use of personal information.  The Privacy Act 
of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-579, § 2(A)(1), 88 Stat. 1896 (1974). 
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The legislative history and congressional hearings regarding the Privacy 
Act reflect several concerns.  Congress was concerned about the inherent 
dangers of the growing ease of electronic surveillance capabilities and 
the vast amount of information gathered about individuals in computer 
data banks.83  With the growing ease of collecting information, Congress 
also feared that the government gathered unnecessary, personal 
information simply because it could.84  Congress worried that such 
collected data could potentially lead to the abuse of power and transform 
America into an “Orwellian” society.85  The Privacy Act of 1974 was 
meant to combat these concerns and curb the federal government’s 
informational privacy intrusions.86 
1.  Overview of the Privacy Act 
Based on the five principles of the “Code of Fair Information 
Practice” set forth in the report published in July 1973 by the 
Department of Health, Education and Welfare,87 the Privacy Act 
 
 83. 120 CONG. REC. 36,902-03 (1974) (remarks by Sen. Jackson), reprinted in SOURCEBOOK, 
supra note 7, at 800-01; Major John F. Joyce, Article: The Privacy Act: A Sword and a Shield But 
Sometimes Neither, 99 MIL. L. REV. 113, 118-19 (1983).  The Privacy Protection Commission 
charged with studying the application of the Privacy Act reported in its 1977 report of the 
accelerating trend on the accumulation of more information about an individual.  PERSONAL 
PRIVACY, supra note 6, at 8. 
 84. S. REP. NO. 93-1183, supra note 7, at 11-13, reprinted in SOURCEBOOK, supra note 7, at 
164-66; Joyce, supra note 83, at 119-20.  For example, Congress noted that the army kept 
unnecessary information about civilians’ attitude toward government policies and created blacklists.  
S. REP. NO. 93-1183, supra note 7, at 13-14, reprinted in SOURCEBOOK, supra note 7, at 166.  The 
Army had very few or no directives to guide their actions.  Id. at 14, reprinted in SOURCEBOOK, 
supra note 7, at 167.  The Army gathered irrelevant information such as personal finances, 
psychiatric diagnosis, and medical records and maintained them in computers.  Id., reprinted in 
SOURCEBOOK, supra note 7, at 167. 
 85. See 120 CONG. REC. 36,647 (1974) (remarks of Rep. Alexander), reprinted in 
SOURCEBOOK, supra note 7, at 893; id. at 36,651 (remarks of Rep. Biaggi), reprinted in 
SOURCEBOOK, supra note 7, at 904; Joyce, supra note 83, at 119-20; see also PERSONAL PRIVACY, 
supra note 6, at 8 (stating that record keeping allows organizations and government agencies to 
possibly monitor individuals). 
 86. S. REP. NO. 93-1183, supra note 7, at 1, 6, reprinted in SOURCEBOOK, supra note 7, at 
154, 159; 120 CONG. REC. 36,902-03 (1974) (remarks by Sen. Jackson), reprinted in SOURCEBOOK, 
supra note 7, at 800; Lodge, supra note 78, at 618.  Because of time pressures, the House and the 
Senate quickly reached a compromise bill through a series of informal meetings held by the 
committee leaders.  Joyce, supra note 83, at 122-23.  Consequently, no committee report exists to 
explain the legislative intent behind many key provisions of the bill as adopted.  Id. at 123. 
 87. See S. REP. NO. 93-1183, supra note 7, at 8-9, reprinted in SOURCEBOOK, supra note 7, at 
161-62; Joyce, supra note 83, at 119.  The five principles of the “Code of Fair Information Practice” 
are: 
There must be no personal data record-keeping systems whose very existence is secret. 
There must be a way for an individual to find out what information about him is in a 
11
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embodies the following eight privacy principles:88 
There shall be no personal-data record-keeping system whose very 
existence is secret and there shall be a policy of openness about an 
organization’s personal-data record-keeping policies, practices, and 
systems.  (The Openness Principle) 
An individual about whom information is maintained by a record-
keeping organization in individually identifiable form shall have a 
right to see and copy that information.  (The Individual Access 
Principle) 
An individual about whom information is maintained by a record-
keeping organization shall have a right to correct or amend the 
substance of that information.  (The Individual Participation Principle) 
There shall be limits on the types of information an organization may 
collect about an individual, as well as certain requirements with respect 
to the manner in which it collects such information.  (The Collection 
Limitation Principle) 
There shall be limits on the internal uses of information about an 
individual within a record-keeping organization.  (The Use Limitation 
Principle) 
There shall be limits on the external disclosures of information about 
an individual a record-keeping organization may make.  (The 
Disclosures Limitation Principle) 
A record-keeping organization shall bear an affirmative responsibility 
for establishing reasonable and proper information management 
policies and practices which assure that its collection, maintenance, 
use, and dissemination of information about an individual is necessary 
and lawful and the information itself is current and accurate.  (The 
 
record and how it is used. 
There must be a way for an individual to prevent information about him that was 
obtained for one purpose from being used or made available for other purposes without 
his consent. 
There must be a way for an individual to correct or amend a record of identifiable 
information about him. 
Any organization creating, maintaining, using, or disseminating records of identifiable 
personal data must assure the reliability of the data for their intended use and must take 
precautions to prevent misuse of the data. 
S. REP. NO. 93-1183, supra note 7, at 9, reprinted in SOURCEBOOK, supra note 7, at 162. 
 88. PERSONAL PRIVACY, supra note 6, at 501. 
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Information Management Principle) 
A record-keeping organization shall be accountable for its personal-
data record-keeping policies, practices, and systems.  (The 
Accountability Principle)89 
At the same time, the Privacy Act also attempts to balance the 
government’s legitimate interest to function efficiently.90  To do so, the 
Privacy Act prohibits federal government agencies’ abilities to disclose, 
maintain, collect, and use information, but contains several 
exemptions.91 
To address privacy concerns, a federal agency may not disclose any 
records unless the disclosure is made because of a written request by, or 
with a written consent from, the individual to whom the record 
pertains.92  An agency must also ascertain the accuracy of all records 
before releasing information.93  A detailed accounting of disclosures 
must be kept so that the agency can forward any corrections or 
amendments to the released information.94  An individual has a right to 
access his own records maintained by an agency and to correct or amend 
inaccuracies.95  Additionally, an agency must maintain information 
relevant to the agency’s purpose only.96  If “information may result in 
adverse determination about an individual’s rights, benefits, and 
privileges under Federal programs,” then the agency must make every 
practical effort to collect information directly from the affected 
individual.97  Finally, an agency must provide the appropriate means of 
security and confidentiality of the records to protect the privacy of the 
individuals.98 
These rights and privacy protections are balanced against the 
government’s need to function efficiently.99  Thus, the restrictions set 
forth are only applicable if the “records” are maintained in a “system of 
 
 89. Id. at 501-502.  These principles are not attributable to any specific Congressional 
statement but are gleaned by the Privacy Commission.  Id. at 502. 
 90. H.R. REP. NO. 93-1416, supra note 7, at 4, reprinted in SOURCEBOOK, supra note 7, at 
297. 
 91. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b)-(f) (2004). 
 92. Id. § 552a(b). 
 93. Id. § 552a(e)(6). 
 94. Id. § 552a(c). 
 95. Id. § 552a(d). 
 96. Id. § 552a(e)(1). 
 97. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(2). 
 98. Id. § 552a(e)(10). 
 99. H.R. REP. NO. 93-1416, supra note 7, at 4, reprinted in SOURCEBOOK, supra note 7, at 
297. 
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records.”100  Additionally, the Privacy Act applies only to federal 
“agencies.”101  Furthermore, the heart of the Privacy Act, the non-
disclosure requirement of individuals’ records, contains twelve 
exceptions that allow agencies to disclose records without the 
individual’s consent.102 
To prevent the federal government’s usurpation of exemptions and 
to guarantee the effectiveness of the rights afforded by the Privacy Act, 
Congress included a civil enforcement provision.103  An individual may 
enforce the Privacy Act by bringing a civil action against an agency in a 
district court.104  In addition to providing specific action and injunction 
as remedies,105 the Privacy Act also allows successful plaintiffs to 
recover monetary damages.106  This is the provision that the Supreme 
Court interpreted in Doe v. Chao.107  Therefore, the provision warrants a 
 
 100. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b), (c), (d), (e).  Id. § 552a(a) lists definitions of terms used in the Privacy 
Act.  Among the terms defined are “record” and “system of records.”  Id. §552a(a)(4)-(5).  A 
“record” means:  
any item, collection, or grouping of information about an individual that is maintained by 
an agency, including, but not limited to, his education, financial transaction, medical 
history, and criminal or employment history and that contains his name, or the 
identifying number, symbol, or other identifying particular assigned to the individual, 
such as a finger or voice print or a photograph.   
Id. §552a(a)(4)  A “system of records” means “a group of any records under the control of any 
agency from which information is retrieved by the name of the individual or by some identifying 
number, symbol, or other identifying particular assigned to the individual.”  Id. at §552(a)(5).  
Because of the advanced electronic searching capabilities that exist today, many have criticized that 
the agencies are maintaining significant amounts of records outside of the technical definition of 
“system of records.”  Julianne M. Sullivan, Comment, Will the Privacy Act of 1974 Still Hold Up in 
2004?  How Advancing Technology Has Created a Need for Change in the “System of Records” 
Analysis, 39 CAL. W. L. REV. 395, 398-99, 402-05 (2003).  For example, it is possible to retrieve 
records of an individual by searching for criteria unrelated to an individual’s identifying name or 
number, such as somebody else’s name.  Id. at 403-04. 
 101. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(a)(1).  See PERSONAL PRIVACY, supra note 6, at 497-99 (recommending 
that the Privacy Act should not expand to include organizations outside the federal government). 
 102. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b)(1)-(12).  Unfortunately, the liberal use of these “routine exceptions,” 
has eroded much of the strength of the non-disclosure requirement.  Coles, supra note 6, at 978-83.  
Particularly, data matching of computer records to find individuals in more than one data base was 
routinely conducted under the “routine exception.”  Schwartz, supra note 6, at 587-88.  To protect 
individuals’ privacy against data matching, Congress passed a major amendment to the Privacy Act 
in 1988, the Computer Matching and Privacy Protection Act.  Computer Matching and Privacy 
Protections Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-503, 102 Stat. 2507 (1988).  The Computer Matching and 
Privacy Protection Act provides little substantive guidance, however, and procedural requirements 
set by the act may not completely eradicate privacy violations from data matching.  Schwartz, supra 
note 6, at 588-89. 
 103. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g). 
 104. Id. § 552a(g)(1)(D). 
 105. Id. § 552a(g)(2)(A)-(B). 
 106. Id. § 552a(g)(4). 
 107. Doe v. Chao, 124 S. Ct. 1204, 1208-10 (2004). 
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closer review of the language, legislative history, and subsequent 
interpretations and guidelines. 
2.  Damages Section: 5 U.S.C. §552a(g)(4) Statutory Language 
Section 552a(g)(4) of the Privacy Act addresses the circumstances 
under which, and the amount of, damages that may be recoverable.108  
Section 552a(g)(4) first defines when the United States is liable for 
damages.109  For the federal government to be liable, a plaintiff must 
prove an “adverse” effect on the plaintiff and an “intentional or willful” 
action by the agency.110  Stated another way, the plaintiff must prove 
that he suffered an “adverse” effect because the agency “intentionally or 
willfully:”111 (1) failed to maintain records of the individual with the 
accuracy, relevance, timeliness, and completeness that was necessary to 
determine the qualifications, character, rights, or opportunities of, or 
benefits to, the individual based on such records;112 or (2) failed to 
comply with any other provisions of the Privacy Act.113  Once the 
plaintiff proves these elements, then Subsections 552a(g)(4)(A) and (B) 
specify the recoverable amount of damages:114 
(g)(4) In any suit brought under the provisions of subsection (g)(1)(C) 
or (D) of this section in which the court determines that the agency 
acted in a manner which was intentional or willful, the United States 
 
 108. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g)(4), (4)(A)-(B). 
 109. Id. § 552a(g)(4). 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. § 552a(g)(1)(C)-(D), (g)(4).  The damage section of the civil remedy provision of the 
Privacy Act provides that: 
Whenever an agency . . . 
(g)(1)(C) fails to maintain any record concerning any individual with such accuracy, 
relevance, timeliness, completeness as is necessary to assure fairness in any 
determination relating to the qualifications, character, rights, or opportunities of, or 
benefits to the individual that may be made on the basis of such record, and consequently 
a determination is made which is adverse to the individual; or 
(D) fails to comply with any other provision of this section, or any rule promulgated 
thereunder, in such a way as to have an adverse effect on an individual, . . . 
(g)(4) In any suit brought under the provisions of subsection (g)(1)(C) or (D) of this 
section in which the court determines that the agency acted in a manner which was 
intentional or willful, the United States shall be liable to the individual in an amount 
equal to the sum of— 
actual damages sustained by the individual as a result of the refusal or failure, but in no 
case shall a person entitled to recovery receive less than the sum of $1,000; and 
the costs of the action together with reasonable attorney fees as determined by the court. 
Id. 
 112. Id. §552a(g)(1)(C), (g)(4). 
 113. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g)(1)(D), (g)(4). 
 114. Id. § 552a(g)(4)(A)-(B). 
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shall be liable to the individual in an amount equal to the sum of— 
actual damages sustained by the individual as a result of the refusal or 
failure, but in no case shall a person entitled to recovery receive less 
than the sum of $1,000; and 
the costs of the action together with reasonable attorney fees as 
determined by the court.115 
The majority in the Supreme Court decided that the language in 
Subsection 552a(g)(4)(A) requires a plaintiff to prove that he sustained 
actual damages before recovering the statutory minimum damage of 
$1,000.  A review of the legislative history concerning Section 
552a(g)(4) is helpful in determining whether the Supreme Court 
accurately interpreted the damage section. 
a.  Legislative History 
Both Democrats and Republicans agreed that privacy was a 
significant issue that required Congress to act quickly.116  However, 
because of Congress’ swift passage of the Privacy Act, there are no 
detailed legislative comments or committee reports to explain many of 
the key provisions of the Privacy Act.117  Despite the paucity of 
legislative comments on the bill that was actually passed, one can glean 
some legislative intent from the changes made to the original versions of 
the Privacy Act.  Because of the immense bipartisan interest, the Senate 
and House of Representatives each introduced its own version of the 
privacy bill.118  The Privacy Act that Congress eventually passed reflects 
a compromise between the Senate’s and House’s version of the Privacy 
Act.119  In fact, one of the key compromises made between the Senate 
 
 115. Id. 
 116. S. REP. NO. 93-1183, supra note 7, at 10, reprinted in SOURCEBOOK, supra note 7, at 163. 
 117. Joyce, supra note 83, at 122-23.  Because of time pressures, the House and the Senate 
quickly reached a compromise bill through a series of informal meetings by the committee leaders.  
Id. at 123.  Consequently, no committee report exists to explain the legislative intent behind many 
key provisions of the bill as adopted.  Id. 
 118. S. 3418, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (May 1, 1974), reprinted in SOURCEBOOK, supra note 7, at 
9-28; H.R. 16,373, 93d Cong., 2d. Sess. (August 12, 2974), reprinted in SOURCEBOOK, supra note 
7, at 239-257. 
 119. 120 CONG. REC. 40,405-13 (1974) (Analysis of House and Senate Compromise 
Amendments to the Federal Privacy Act), reprinted in SOURCEBOOK, supra note 7, at 858-77; Id. at 
40,881-86 (Analysis of House and Senate Compromise Amendments to the Federal Privacy Act), 
reprinted in SOURCEBOOK, supra note 7, at 985-1001. 
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and the House related to the damages section of the Privacy Act.120 
The Senate was interested in providing strong enforcement and 
remedy provisions for individuals.121  The Senate’s original version of 
the Privacy Act allowed individuals to recover actual and punitive 
damages, when appropriate, for any violation of the privacy bill.122  The 
Senate, then, revised the provision to drop the punitive damages remedy 
but allowed individuals to recover actual and general damages, in an 
amount no less than $1,000, upon a showing of an agency’s 
negligence.123  The Senate never fully debated whether it intended 
individuals to prove damages in order to recover the statutory minimum 
of $1,000 in any of the debates or hearings.124  However, the Senate’s 
memorandum during the Congressional debate indicates that Congress 
intended the $1,000 statutory minimum recovery to be liquidated 
damages.125  Therefore, the Senate most likely never intended 
individuals to prove actual damages before allowing recovery of the 
 
 120. 120 CONG. REC. 40,406-07 (1974), reprinted in SOURCEBOOK, supra note 7, at 861-62; 
id. at 40,882, reprinted in SOURCEBOOK, supra note 7, at 989-90. 
 121. S. REP. NO. 93-1183, supra note 7, at 82-83, reprinted in SOURCEBOOK, supra note 7, at 
235-36. 
 122. 120 CONG. REC. 12,649 (1974), reprinted in SOURCEBOOK, supra note 7, at 27.  The 
original Senate version as introduced by Senator Ervin stated: 
304(b)Any person who violates the provisions of this Act, or any rule, regulation, or 
order issued thereunder, shall be liable to any person aggrieved thereby in an amount 
equal to the sum of— 
any actual damages sustained by an individual; 
punitive damages where appropriate; 
in the case of any successful action to enforce any liability under this section, the costs of 
the action together with reasonable attorney’s fess as determined by the court. 
Id. 
 123. S. 3418, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (as amended November 21, 1974), reprinted in 
SOURCEBOOK, supra note 7, at 371.  The revised Senate version of the act stated: 
303(c)The United States shall be liable for the actions or omissions of any officer or 
employee of the Government who violates the provisions of this Act, or any rule, 
regulation, or order issued thereunder in the same manner and to the same extent as a 
private individual under like circumstances to any person aggrieved thereby in an 
amount equal to the sum of— 
any actual and general damages sustained by any person but in no case shall a person 
entitled to recovery receive less than the sum of $1,000; and 
in the case of any successful action to enforce any liability under this section, the costs of 
the action together with reasonable attorney’s fees as determined by the court. 
Id. 
 124. See 120 CONG. REC. 36,885-36,921 (1974), reprinted in SOURCEBOOK, supra note 7, at 
763-838. 
 125. Id. at 36,891, reprinted in SOURCEBOOK, supra note 7, at 768.  The amendment was made 
to allow “an individual suing under the Act . . . to recover both actual and general damages and . . . 
[include] a provision for liquidated damages of say $1,000 into the assessed against the agency for a 
violation of the Act.”  Id. 
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statutory minimum of $1,000. 
On the other hand, the House, while concerned about remedy 
provisions for individuals, was more concerned about the scope of the 
government’s liability.126  The House’s original version allowed an 
individual suffering from some “adverse” effect from an agency’s 
violation of the act to recover punitive or actual damages, depending on 
the agency’s level of intent.127  The revised version adopted by the 
House, like the Senate, dropped the punitive damages provision.  
However, while the Senate’s version only required an agency’s 
negligence to find liability, the House allowed an individual to recover 
actual damages only if the agency’s violation of the act was “willful, 
arbitrary, or capricious.”128 
 
 126. Id. at 36,659-60 (remarks of Rep. McCloskey, Rep. Fascell, and Rep. Erlenborn), 
reprinted in SOURCEBOOK, supra note 7, at 922-24. 
 127. H.R. 16,393, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (August 12, 1974), reprinted in SOURCEBOOK, supra 
note 7, at 249-51.  The original version stated that: 
(f)(1) Whenever any agency (A) refuses to comply with an individual request under 
subsection (d)(1) of this section, (B) fails to maintain any record concerning any 
individual with such accuracy, relevance, timeliness, and completeness as is necessary to 
assure fairness in any determination relating to such individual’s qualifications, 
character, rights, opportunities, or benefits that may be made on the basis of such records 
and consequently makes such a determination which is adverse to the individual, or (C) 
fails to comply with any other provision of this section, or any rule promulgated 
thereunder, in such a way as to have an adverse effect on an individual, such individual 
may bring a civil action against such agency . . . 
In any suit brought pursuant to the provisions of subsection (f)(1) in which the court 
determines— 
(A)  that the agency’s refusal or failure has been willful, the agency shall be liable to the 
individual in an amount equal to the sum of— 
(i)  actual damages sustained by the individual as a result of such refusal or failure; 
punitive damages allowed by the court; and 
the costs of the action together with reasonable attorney’s fees as determined by the 
court; or 
(B) that the agency’s refusal or failure has been negligent, the agency shall be liable to 
the individual in an amount equal to the sum of— 
(i)  any actual damages sustained by the individual as a result of such refusal or failure; 
and 
(ii) the costs of the action together with reasonable attorney’s fees as determined by the 
court. 
Id. 
 128. H.R. 16,373, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (as amended October 2, 1974), reprinted in 
SOURCEBOOK, supra note 7, at 288 and in H.R. REP. NO. 93-1416, supra note 7, at 31-32, reprinted 
in SOURCEBOOK, supra note 7, at 324-25.  Thus, the revised House version retained other provisions 
of the remedy section but revised the amount of damage section to: 
(3)  In any suit brought under the provisions of subsection (g)(1)(B) and (C) of this 
section in which the court determines that the agency acted in a manner which was 
willful, arbitrary, or capricious, the United States shall be liable to the individual in an 
amount equal to the sum of— 
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The debate among the Congressmen regarding the elimination of 
the punitive damage section reveals concerns on the adequacy of the 
remedy and the government’s exposure to potentially high liability.129  
Several Congressmen expressed concerns over the removal of the 
punitive damages provision because they believed that proving actual 
damages would be difficult.130  Thus, many believed that actual damages 
alone would be an inadequate remedy.131  In fact, the House of 
Representatives debated whether to amend the bill to re-insert the 
punitive damage section when the agency acted in a “willful, capricious, 
and arbitrary” manner.132  The debate evinces that the House understood 
proving that an agency’s violation was “willful, capricious, and 
arbitrary” would be difficult, but also feared that excessive liability 
could exceed the government’s budgetary constraints.133 
The damages provision of the finalized Privacy Act reflects a 
compromise between the Senate and the House on the extent of the 
government’s liability.134  The extent of the government’s liability 
depends on (1) the level of intent required to hold an agency liable and 
(2) the measure of damages allowed for recovery.135  The Senate and the 
House compromised on both of these factors.136  The Privacy Act’s 
requirement to hold an agency liable for “intentional or willful” conduct 
is a lower level of intent required than the House’s version of “willful, 
arbitrary or capricious” intent requirement but is a higher level of intent 
requirement than the Senate’s version of negligent requirement.137  By 
keeping the Senate’s $1,000 minimum recovery language, the finalized 
 
(A) actual damages sustained by the individual as a result of the refusal or failure; and 
(B) the costs of the action together with reasonable attorney fees as determined by the 
court. 
Id. 
 129. See infra notes 130-33. 
 130. H.R. REP. NO. 93-1416, supra note 7, at 38, reprinted in SOURCEBOOK, supra note 7, at 
330. 
 131. Id. 
 132. 120 CONG. REC. 36,658-60 (1974) (remarks of Rep. Fascell, Rep. McCloskey, Rep. 
Eckhardt, and Rep. Erlenborn), reprinted in SOURCEBOOK, supra note 7, at 919-24. 
 133. Id. at 36,659-60 (remarks of Rep. Fascell and Rep. Erlenborn), reprinted in SOURCEBOOK, 
supra note 7, at 923. 
 134. Compare S. 3418, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (as amended November 21, 1974), reprinted in 
SOURCEBOOK, supra note 7, at 371 with H.R. 16,373, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (as amended October 2, 
1974), reprinted in SOURCEBOOK, supra note 7, at 288. 
 135. See infra notes 136-138. 
 136. Compare S. 3418, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (as amended November 21, 1974), reprinted in 
SOURCEBOOK, supra note 7, at 371 with H.R. 16,373, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (as amended October 2, 
1974), reprinted in SOURCEBOOK, supra note 7, at 288. 
 137. 120 CONG. REC. 40,406 (1974) (Analysis of House and Senate Compromise Amendments 
to the Federal Privacy Act), reprinted in SOURCEBOOK, supra note 7, at 862. 
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Privacy Act also allows for damages greater than the House’s version of 
“actual damages” recovery, but allows less than the Senate’s previous 
version, which had provided for “general damages” as well.138 
The analysis of the compromised damages provision submitted by 
the House and the Senate does not explicitly address whether Congress 
intended individuals to prove actual damages before recovering the 
statutory minimum of $1,000.139  However, interpretations by two 
entities following the passage of the Privacy Act are helpful on this 
issue.140  Congress charged the Privacy Protection Study Commission 
(the “Commission”) to study and recommend changes to the Privacy Act 
and the Office of Management and Budget (the “OMB”) to oversee and 
create guidelines in implementing the Privacy Act.141  Following the 
passage of the Privacy Act, the Commission published a report and the 
OMB released guidelines, on the damages provision of the Privacy 
Act.142 
b.  Subsequent Studies, Recommendations, and Guidelines 
Congress established the Commission to serve for two years to 
examine certain issues concerning the Privacy Act, including whether 
the government should be liable for general damages resulting from a 
willful or intentional violation of the Privacy Act.143  The Commission 
did not explicitly address whether individuals must prove “actual 
damages” in order to recover the statutory minimum damage of $1,000.  
What the Commission did recommend, however, implied that the 
Commission did not believe individuals had to prove “actual damages” 
in order to recover the statutory minimum damage of $1,000.144 
The Commission first addressed the standing requirement of the 
individual in Section 552a(g)(4) before addressing recoverable 
 
 138. See S. 3418, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (as amended November 21, 1974), reprinted in 
SOURCEBOOK, supra note 7, at 371; H.R. 16,373, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (as amended October 2, 
1974), reprinted in SOURCEBOOK, supra note 7, at 288. 
 139. Id. at 40,406, reprinted in SOURCEBOOK, supra note 7, at 861-62; id. at 40,882, reprinted 
in SOURCEBOOK, supra note 7, at 989-90. 
 140. See infra notes 141-162. 
 141. The Privacy Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-579, §§ 5, 6, 88 Stat. 1896 (1974). 
 142. But see Baker v. Dep’t of Navy, 814 F.2d 1381, 1383 (9th Cir. 1987) (stating that 
although OMB guidelines are not binding on the courts, courts look to the guidelines for guidance); 
Zeller v. United States, 467 F. Supp. 487, 497 (D.C.N.Y. 1979) (stating that OMB guidelines are not 
binding on the courts). 
 143. The Privacy Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-579, § 5(c)(2)(B)(iii), 88 Stat. 1896, 1905 
(1974). 
 144. PERSONAL PRIVACY, supra note 6, at 529-32. 
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damages.145  According to the Commission, Section 552a(g)(4) required 
an individual to prove his standing by showing that he suffered “actual 
injury” or “adverse effect” before he could recover any damages.146  The 
Commission found that civil remedies were ineffective, in part, because 
of the difficulty in proving individuals’ standing or showing an “actual 
injury.”147  The Commission recommended enforcing compliance with 
the Privacy Act and allowing individuals’ standing to bring lawsuits 
without requiring individuals to show an “injury or adverse effect.”148  If 
the Commission believed that a standing requirement of “actual injury” 
was too difficult to prove, surely the Commission would have also 
addressed the difficulty of proving “actual damages” itself for recovery 
of the statutory minimum of $1,000.  The House certainly addressed the 
difficulty of proving “actual damages.”149  Yet, the Commission did not 
address, or even recommend, eliminating proof of “actual damages” for 
recovery of statutory minimum. 
Nor did the Commission fail to discuss Section 552a(g)(4)(A) or 
the “actual damages” provision of the civil remedies.  Because of 
Congress’ specific mandate to the Commission to examine whether to 
include “general damages” provision, the Commission provided a 
thoughtful analysis of the meaning of the term “actual damages.”150  The 
Commission found that the term “actual damages” was synonymous 
with the term “special damages” as used in defamation cases to allow 
recovery for pecuniary losses only.151  In light of the limited amount of 
recovery and in the interest of balancing individuals’ privacy protection 
and the public purse, the Commission recommended amending the 
“actual damages” provision.152  The Commission recommended 
replacing the term “actual damages” with the term “special damages and 
general damages,” with certain restrictions.153  The limits set on the 
“general damages” would allow the minimal recovery of $1,000, but no 
more than $10,000 in excess of any special damages.154 
The Commission’s recommendations show that the Commission 
 
 145. Id. at 529. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. 
 149. See supra notes 130-133 and accompanying text (discussing the debate in the House 
regarding the elimination of punitive damage provision and adequacy of the actual damage as 
remedy). 
 150. PERSONAL PRIVACY, supra note 6, at 530-32. 
 151. Id. at 530. 
 152. Id. at 531. 
 153. Id. at 530. 
 154. Id. at 531. 
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carefully and thoroughly considered the effects and consequences of the 
damage provision.  Thus, the conspicuous lack of analysis on the issue 
of requiring proof of “actual damages” for recovery of the statutory 
minimum of $1,000 strongly intimates that the Commission did not 
interpret the Privacy Act to require such proof from individuals. 
The OMB, on the other hand, explicitly stated that the Privacy Act 
does not require individuals to prove “actual damages” in order to 
recover the statutory minimum of $1,000.155  Congress conferred more 
permanent responsibilities to the OMB; Congress directed the OMB to 
(1) create guidelines and regulations for agencies to implement the 
Privacy Act; and (2) assist and oversee the implementation.156  
Accordingly, the OMB issued its first Privacy Act Guidelines on July 9, 
1975, just six months after the passage of the Privacy Act.157  With 
respect to the civil remedy provision, the OMB interpreted that: 
When the court finds that an agency has acted willfully or intentionally 
in violation of the Act in such a manner as to have an adverse effect 
upon the individual, the United States will be required to pay: 
Actual damages or $1,000, whichever is greater; and 
Court costs and attorney fees.158 
Although the OMB has amended its Privacy Act Guidelines 
numerous times over the past 30 years, significantly, the OMB never 
altered its interpretation of the civil remedy provision.159  Thus, the 
 
 155. See infra notes 157-160 and accompanying text. 
 156. The Privacy Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-579, § 6, 88 Stat. 1896, 1905 (1974).  The 
Privacy Act stated that: 
§ 6.  The Office of Management and Budget shall— 
develop guidelines and regulations for the use of agencies in implementing the 
provisions of Section 552a of Title 5, United States Code, as added by Section 3 of this 
Act; and provide continuing assistance to and oversight of the implementation of the 
provisions of such section by agencies. 
Id. 
 157. Office of Management and Budget, Privacy Act Guidelines, 40 Fed. Reg. 28,949 (1975) 
[hereinafter OMB GUIDELINES]. 
 158. Id. at 28970.  Although OMB Guidelines are not binding on the courts, courts give 
deference to the guidelines in interpreting the Privacy Act.  Baker v. Dep’t of Navy, 814 F.2d 1381, 
1383 (9th Cir. 1987) (stating that although OMB guidelines are not binding on the courts, courts 
look to the guidelines for guidance and citing case that stated courts defer to the guidelines). 
 159. See 40 Fed. Reg. at 56,741, 44 Fed. Reg. 23,138 (1979); 47 Fed. Reg. 21,656 (1982); 48 
Fed. Reg. 15,556 (1983); 49 Fed. Reg. 12,338 (1984); 50 Fed. Reg. 52,738 (1985); 52 Red. Reg. 
12,990 (1987); 54 Fed. Reg. 25,821 (1989); 58 Fed. Reg. 36,075 (1993); 59 Fed. Reg. 37,914 
(1994); 61 Fed. Reg. 6,435 (1996); Doe v. Chao, 124 S. Ct. 1204, 1216 (2004) (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting). 
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OMB believed that the Privacy Act requires only proof of a “willful or 
intentional” violation coupled with an “adverse effect” on an individual 
for the individual to recover the statutory minimum of $1,000.160  
Because the OMB’s principal responsibility is to interpret the Privacy 
Act to guide the agencies, the OMB’s interpretation should be viewed 
with great significance.161  In fact, prior to Doe v. Chao, the majority of 
circuits adopted the OMB’s interpretation that individuals may recover 
the statutory minimum damage of $1,000 after proving an “adverse 
effect” from the agency’s “intentional or willful” violation of the Privacy 
Act.162 
The Privacy Act’s plain language, legislative history, the 
Commission’s recommendation, the OMB’s interpretation, and the 
interpretation adopted by a majority of the circuits all clearly pointed to 
allowing individuals to recover the statutory minimum damage of $1,000 
without requiring proof of actual damages.  Then, in February 2004, a 
divided Supreme Court drastically altered this course. 
 
 160. But see Doe, 124 S. Ct. at 1216, n. 2 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).  Justice Ginsburg in her 
dissent noted that the government communicated informally with an unnamed OMB official who 
stated that the OMB does not believe individuals are allowed the statutory minimum of $1,000 
recovery without sustaining actual damages.  Id. However, such informal OMB communication 
“cannot override OMB’s contemporaneous, long-published construction of §552a(g)(4).”  Id. 
 161. Baker, 814 F.2d at 1383 (9th Cir. 1987) (stating that although the OMB guidelines are not 
binding on the courts, courts look to the guidelines for guidance and citing case that stated courts 
defer to the guidelines). 
 162. See Orekoya v. Mooney, 330 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2003), overruled in part by Doe v. Chao, 
124 S. Ct. 1204 (2004) (stating that the majority adopted the OMB’s interpretation and the First 
Circuit adopts the majority interpretation); Doe v. Chao, 306 F.3d 170, 189 (4th Cir. 2002) 
(Michael, J., dissenting) (stating that the majority interprets no proof of actual damage for the 
statutory minimum recovery of $1,000 and citing various cases); Wilborn v. Dep’t of Health and 
Human Serv., 49 F.3d 597, 603 (9th Cir. 1995), overruled in part by Doe v. Chao, 124 S. Ct. 1204 
(2004) (holding that plaintiff with no provable damages is allowed the statutory damage of $1,000); 
Quinn v. Stone, 978 F.2d 126, 131, 135 (3d. Cir. 1992) (discussing an adverse effect as a causal 
standing requirement but omitting proof of actual damages as a requirement to recover damages); 
Waters v. Thornburgh, 888 F.2d 870, 872 (D.C. Cir. 1989), overruled in part by Doe v. Chao, 124 
S. Ct. 1204 (2004) (stating that plaintiff is “entitled to the greater of $1,000 or the actual damages 
sustained” if plaintiff establishes “intentional or willful” violation and “adverse effect” on the 
plaintiff); Johnson v. Dep’t of Treasury, 700 F.2d 971, 977 n.12 (5th Cir. 1983), overruled in part 
by Doe v. Chao, 124 S. Ct. 1204 (2004) (stating that statutory minimum of $1,000 is obviously 
recoverable without provable damage); Fitzpatrick v. IRS, 665 F.2d 327, 330-31 (11th Cir. 1982), 
overruled in part by Doe v. Chao, 124 S. Ct. 1204 (2004) (stating that plaintiffs that suffered injury 
with no provable damage could still recover $1,000); Parks v. IRS, 618 F.2d 677, 683 (10th Cir. 
1980) (stating that plaintiff states claim for statutory minimum of $1,000 by showing intentional or 
willful violation of the Privacy Act and suffered adverse effect).  But see Hudson v. Reno, 130 F.3d 
1193, 1207 (6th Cir. 1997) (stating that plaintiff cannot recover because of failure to show actual 
damages), overruled in part by, Pollard v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 532 U.S. 843 (2001). 
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III.  DOE V. CHAO: ALTERING THE COURSE 
Justice Souter wrote for the majority in the Supreme Court in Doe 
v. Chao,163 and Justice Ginsburg wrote the main dissenting opinion, with 
Justices Stevens and Breyer joining her dissent.164  The Court’s decision 
marks a fundamental shift in the ability of individuals to recover the 
statutory minimum damage of $1,000 under the Privacy Act.  The facts 
of the case are straightforward, and the only issue addressed by the 
Court is whether a plaintiff must prove actual damages to recover the 
minimal statutory award of $1,000.165 
In Doe v. Chao, the petitioner, Buck Doe, was one of many 
individuals who filed for benefits under the Black Lung Benefits Act 
with the Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs (the “Labor 
Agency”).166  Doe disclosed his social security number in his application 
form.167  The Labor Agency used Doe’s and other black lung claimants’ 
social security numbers to identify the claims on “multi-captioned” 
notices of hearings.  Because the notices were sent to numerous parties, 
such as other claimants, other claimants’ employers, and other attorneys, 
the Labor Agency violated the Privacy Act’s non-disclosure requirement 
by releasing Doe’s social security number without his permission to 
third parties.168  Thereafter, Doe and six other claimants sued the 
Department of Labor for violation of the Privacy Act.169  The District 
Court entered judgment against all plaintiffs, except against Doe.170  In 
Doe’s case, the District Court granted Doe’s motion for summary 
judgment based on his uncontroverted evidence of emotional distress 
and awarded him the statutory minimum damage of $1,000.171 
A divided Fourth Circuit panel reversed the summary judgment 
awarded to Doe.172  The Fourth Circuit held that a plaintiff must prove 
actual damages arising from an agency’s violation in order to recover the 
 
 163. Doe v. Chao, 124 S. Ct. 1204, 1206 (2004). 
 164. Id. at 1213 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 165. Id. at 1206.  Both parties agreed that the Department of Labor’s violation was “willful or 
intentional” and that the petitioner suffered an “adverse effect” from the violation.  Id. at 1213. 
 166. Id. at 1206. 
 167. Id. 
 168. Id.; 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b). 
 169. Doe, 124 S. Ct. at 1206. 
 170. Id. at 1207.  The District Court also denied class certification sought by plaintiffs for all 
claimants since the enactment of the Privacy Act.  Id. at 1206-07.  The Department of Labor 
stipulated to stop publishing social security numbers of the claimants for future notices, and cross-
motions for summary judgments followed.  Id. 
 171. Id. at 1207. 
 172. Doe, 124 S. Ct. at 1207.  The Fourth Circuit also affirmed in part to hold that the 
Department of Labor should be awarded summary judgment against all plaintiffs.  Id. 
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statutory minimum damage of $1,000.173  The Fourth Circuit further 
found that Doe’s conclusory allegations of emotional distress did not rise 
to a triable issue of fact on proving actual damages.174  Doe petitioned 
for review, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari to affirm the Fourth 
Circuit’s decision.175 
Doe took the position that any plaintiff adversely affected by an 
agency’s intentional or willful violation is entitled to the statutory 
minimum damage of $1,000.176  The Department of Labor argued that a 
plaintiff must also prove some actual damage to recover the statutory 
minimum.177  The Supreme Court began the analysis with the text of the 
applicable Privacy Act provision.178  Specifically, the Court concentrated 
on Subsection 552a(g)(4)(A).179  Section 552a(g)(4) provides: 
(g)(4) In any suit brought under the provisions of subsection (g)(1)(C) 
or (D) of this section in which the court determines that the agency 
acted in a manner which was intentional or willful, the United States 
shall be liable to the individual in an amount equal to the sum of— 
(A) actual damages sustained by the individual as a result of the refusal 
or failure, but in no case shall a person entitled to recovery receive less 
than the sum of $1,000; and 
(B) the costs of the action together with reasonable attorney fees as 
determined by the court.180 
The Court noted that looking backward from the point of the $1,000 
statutory minimum, the $1,000 award is limited to the “person entitled to 
recovery.”181  The Court reasoned that “person entitled to recovery” 
must refer immediately back to the preceding phrase “actual damages 
sustained” to define the elements necessary for a class of persons 
eligible for the statutory minimum award of $1,000.182  Thus, the Court 
ruled that a plaintiff must prove: (1) intentional or willful violation; (2) 
adverse effect on the individual; and (3) actual damages before the 
 
 173. Id. 
 174. Id. 
 175. Id. 
 176. Id. at 1208. 
 177. Doe, 124 S. Ct. at 1208. 
 178. Id. 
 179. Id. 
 180. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g)(4). 
 181. Doe, 124 S. Ct. at 1208. 
 182. Id. 
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plaintiff can recover the statutory minimum damage of $1,000.183 
The majority in the Court also provided additional justification for 
rejecting Doe’s interpretation of the damage provision of the Privacy 
Act.184  First, the Court stated that Doe’s statutory reading creates 
tension.185  The Court reasoned that Doe’s interpretation treats the 
willful or intentional act as the last element necessary to find the 
government liable.186  The Court argued that such an interpretation 
ignores the fact that liability is qualified by enumerated damages.187 
Second, the majority pointed out that Doe’s position contradicts 
traditional tort recovery, which requires a wrongful act, causation, and 
proof of some harm.188  The Court conceded that the Privacy Act’s claim 
may be more analogous to privacy torts, which presumes “general 
damages.”189  However, the Court observed that although Congress 
included a “general damage” provision in earlier drafts of the privacy 
bill, Congress deleted the provision in the final bill.190  Therefore, the 
Court concluded that the deliberate elimination precludes awarding 
presumed damages and compels interpretation of “person entitled to 
recovery” to include the requirement of proof of “actual damages.”191 
Justice Ginsburg disagreed with the Court’s reasoning.192  After 
 
 183. Id. at 1208, 1212. 
 184. Id. at 1208-10. 
 185. Id. at 1208-09. 
 186. Id. at 1209. 
 187. Doe, 124 S. Ct. at 1209.  The Court later also noted that Doe’s interpretation would leave 
a conditional guarantee with no purpose in the statute.  Id. at 1210. 
 188. Id. at 1209. 
 189. Id. 
 190. Id. at 1209-10. 
 191. Doe, 124 S. Ct. at 1209-10.  The Court also addressed three other issues raised by Doe.  
Id. at 1210.  First, the Court disregarded Doe’s argument that it is illogical for a victim who suffered 
an adverse effect from an intentional or willful violation of an agency without also suffering actual 
damages.  Id.  Because the “adverse effect” serves to identify a plaintiff who satisfies the causation 
and standing requirements, the Court posited that it is possible to have only enough injury to bring 
an action without actual damages.  Id. at 1211.  Doe also raised the oddity in guaranteeing a 
minimal presumed damage to plaintiffs who can prove some actual damages.  Doe, 124 S. Ct. at 
1211.  The Court responded that such a requirement is not peculiar because such a remedial scheme 
already exists for defamation torts; plaintiffs in certain defamation suits could only recover 
presumed damages by proving some pecuniary loss.  Id.  Lastly, Doe pointed out two other statutes 
with remedial provisions similar to the Privacy Act that support his interpretation of the Privacy 
Act.  Id. at 1212.  The Court discounted analogies to one of the statutes because of the lack of the 
phrasing “entitled to recovery.”  Id.  Furthermore, the Court refused to review the legislative history 
of the statutes citing the unreliability of the subsequent legislative history outside of the statute at 
issue.  Id. 
 192. Doe, 124 S. Ct. at 1213-21 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).  Justice Stevens and Justice Breyer 
joined Justice Ginsburg’s dissent.  Id. at 1213.  Justice Breyer also wrote a short, separate dissent, to 
emphasize that Justice Ginsburg’s interpretation would not increase the government’s exposure to 
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reviewing the statutory construct of the civil remedy provision, Justice 
Ginsburg argued that the Court should have adopted the prevailing 
interpretation that individuals are not required to prove actual damages 
to recover the statutory minimum damage of $1,000.193  Justice Ginsburg 
advanced several reasons for rejecting the majority’s interpretation.194 
First, Justice Ginsburg argued that the plain language of the statute 
does not support the Court’s interpretation.195  Justice Ginsburg pointed 
out that proper construction of the statute requires a review of the 
placement of terms in the statute.196  The terms “actual damages” and 
“person entitled to relief” appear in the text after conditions necessary to 
find agencys liability.197  Justice Ginsburg explained that if Congress 
intended individuals to prove actual damages to recover the statutory 
minimum damage of $1,000, the statute would have been written to 
include “in no case shall a person who proves such damages . . . receive 
less than $1,000.”198  Moreover, Justice Ginsburg criticized the 
majority’s statutory interpretation because it left several terms 
superfluous and failed to give effect to every word and clause.199  Justice 
Ginsburg gave examples to illustrate her criticism.200  She argued that 
the majority’s interpretation would render the term “shall be liable” to 
“may be liable,” and the “adverse effect” element would be eliminated 
by the majority’s requirement that a plaintiff must prove “actual 
damages” in order to recover the statutory minimum.201  Additionally, 
Justice Ginsburg pointed out that the prevailing view of the court of 
appeals and the OMB’s interpretation support the interpretation that the 
$1,000 recovery is independent from proof of actual damages.202 
Additionally, Justice Ginsburg argued that the purpose and 
legislative history of the Privacy Act support her interpretation.203  
Because Privacy Act violations often result in emotional harm only, 
Justice Ginsburg argued that Congress intended individuals to recover 
for “any damages.”204  Thus, Justice Ginsburg reasoned that the $1,000 
 
liability.  Id. at 1221 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 193. Id. at 1215 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 194. See id. at 1213-21. 
 195. Id. at 1213. 
 196. Doe, 124 S. Ct. at 1213. 
 197. Id. at 1214. 
 198. Id. 
 199. Id. at 1214-15. 
 200. Id. 
 201. Id. at 1215. 
 202. Doe, 124 S. Ct. at 1215-16. 
 203. Id. at 1216. 
 204. Id. 
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statutory damage award was meant to give individuals incentives to 
enforce the Privacy Act by allowing recovery for “non-pocketbook 
harm.”205 
IV.  ANALYSIS OF DOE V. CHAO 
The Supreme Court’s narrow construction of the Privacy Act will 
force individuals to overcome unrealistic hurdles.  The majority 
contorted the statute and the legislative history to reach a result that 
restricts individuals from effectively enforcing the Privacy Act.206  On 
the other hand, the dissent’s straightforward statutory construction is 
consistent with the purpose of the Privacy Act.207  The Court’s restrictive 
interpretation is especially disturbing because the Court, in effect, held 
that individuals have no remedy for the government’s unlawful 
disclosure of a person’s social security number.208  But if individuals 
have no effective remedy, who will enforce the Privacy Act?  
Historically, the government has proven itself to be a poor enforcer of 
the Privacy Act.209  Thus, the Court’s ruling in Doe v. Chao decimates 
the likelihood of future enforcement of the Privacy Act. 
A.  Statutory Interpretation and Legislative History Support the 
Dissent’s Interpretation 
The interpretation of the damage section of the Privacy Act begins 
with the plain language of the statute itself.210  Therefore, we begin with 
an analysis of the plain language of the statute and the Court’s 
 
 205. Doe, 124 S. Ct. at 1218-19.  Justice Ginsburg also observed that fears of exposing the 
government to disproportionate liability never materialized in nearly 30 years of the enforcement of 
the Privacy Act.  Id. at 1217-18.  Justice Ginsburg also criticized the majority’s interpretation 
because it forces individuals to manufacture provable, albeit small, actual damages such as a $10 fee 
paid to obtain a credit report.  Id. at 1217.  Finally, Justice Ginsburg argued that other privacy 
statutes include similar civil remedy provisions and have been interpreted to allow the statutory 
minimum recovery without proving actual damages.  Id. at 1219-20. 
 206. See Doe, 124 S. Ct. at 1206-12. 
 207. See id. at 1213-21 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 208. See id. at 1206-07 (discussing how Doe brought an action for an agency’s disclosure of 
his social security number to third parties without his permission and how Doe must prove actual 
damages before recovering the $1,000 statutory minimum); see also supra notes 166-191 and 
accompanying text. 
 209. See infra notes 242-267 and accompanying text (discussing how the government fails to 
protect privacy and the lack of incentives for the government to protect privacy). 
 210. See Ardestani v. Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 502 U.S. 129, 135 (1991) (stating 
that the actual language of the statute is the starting point in statutory interpretation); Kaiser 
Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. Bonjorno et al., 494 U.S. 827, 835 (1990) (stating same). 
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interpretation of the damages provision.211  The applicable Section 
552a(g)(4) states as follows: 
(g)(4) In any suit brought under the provisions of subsection (g)(1)(C) 
or (D) of this section in which the court determines that the agency 
acted in a manner which was intentional or willful, the United States 
shall be liable to the individual in an amount equal to the sum of— 
(A) actual damages sustained by the individual as a result of the refusal 
or failure, but in no case shall a person entitled to recovery receive less 
than the sum of $1,000; and 
(B) the costs of the action together with reasonable attorney fees as 
determined by the court.212 
The Court clearly wanted to support the Department of Labor’s 
interpretation and twisted a straightforward statutory construction in 
order to do so.  The majority achieved its result by starting from the last 
clause of Subsection 552a(g)(4)(A) and stressing the importance of 
linking “entitled to recovery” to the immediately preceding clause of 
“actual damages sustained.”213  The most natural way to read a statute, 
however, is to start from the beginning of the statute and to place all the 
words in their context.214  If the Court interpreted Section 552a(g)(4) 
from the beginning, the Court would see that Section 552a(g)(4) ends 
with the clause “the United States shall be liable to the individual in an 
amount equal to the sum of” before the provision separates into 
Subsections (A) and (B).215  The most natural interpretation of this 
clause is that the clause preceding “shall be liable” defines conditions in 
which the government may be found liable.  Naturally, one would also 
expect to read the measure of damages following the clause “shall be 
liable . . . in an amount equal to the sum of.”  As expected, following 
this clause, the provision starts two new Subsections, (A) and (B), that 
 
 211. See Doe, 124 S. Ct. at 1208. 
 212. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g)(4). 
 213. Doe, 124 S. Ct. at 1208; see also supra notes 181-183 and accompanying text. 
 214. See generally Nat’l Labor Relations Bd. v. Ky. River Cmty. Care, Inc., 532 U.S. 706 
(2001) (analyzing statutory interpretation by reviewing the structure of the National Labor Relations 
Act); Davis v. Mich. Dep’t of Treasury, 489 U.S. 803, 809 (1989) (stating that language in a statute 
must be read in context and in place of the overall statutory scheme). 
 215. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g)(4).  The Section begins as follows: 
(g)(4) In any suit brought under the provisions of subsection (g)(1)(C) or (D) of this section in 
which the court determines that the agency acted in a manner which was intentional or willful, the 
United States shall be liable to the individual in an amount equal to the sum of—. 
Id. 
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define measure of damages—actual and statutory minimal damages in 
Subsection (A) and the costs of action and reasonable attorney fees in 
Subsection (B).216 
In particular, Subsection (A) provides recovery for actual damages, 
“but in no case shall a person entitled to recovery receive less than the 
sum of $1,000.”217  Because Subsection (A) is most naturally read only 
as a clause for the measure of damage in the overall statutory scheme of 
Section 552a(g)(4), the clause in Subsection (A) should be interpreted to 
allow either (1) actual damages, or if actual damages are diminutive or 
non-existent, (2) $1,000.  By stressing the importance of the “entitled to 
recovery” clause more than the overall statutory scheme, the majority 
neglected the “shall be liable” clause that signals the beginning of the 
measure of damages Subsections.  In fact, as Justice Ginsburg cogently 
articulated in her dissent, the majority’s interpretation alters the words 
“shall be liable” effectively into “may be liable.”218 
More importantly, the majority completely failed to focus on the 
appropriate legislative history regarding the statutory minimum damage 
of $1,000.219  In reviewing the legislative history, the majority 
emphasized the elimination of the presumed “general damages” 
provision.220  Instead, the majority should have addressed the 
significance of the inclusion of the $1,000 damage amount as a 
compromise provision to the various provisions submitted by the Senate 
and the House.221  As the majority accurately observed, the previous 
Senate version of the remedy provision included both “actual” and 
“general” damages but deleted the “general damages” in the final 
privacy bill.222  However, the deletion of the “general damages” 
provision is not relevant for purposes of construing whether the $1,000 
 
 216. Id. § 552a(g)(4).  Subsections 552a(g)(4)(A) and (B) are as follows: 
(g)(4) In any suit brought under the provisions of subsection (g)(1)(C) or (D) of this 
section in which the court determines that the agency acted in a manner which was 
intentional or willful, the United States shall be liable to the individual in an amount 
equal to the sum of— 
(A)  actual damages sustained by the individual as a result of the refusal or failure, but in 
no case shall a person entitled to recovery receive less than the sum of $1,000; and 
(B)  the costs of the action together with reasonable attorney fees as determined by the 
court. 
Id. 
 217. Id. § 552(a)(g)(4)(A). 
 218. Doe, 124 S. Ct. at 1215 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 219. See id. at 1208. 
 220. Id. at 1209-10. 
 221. Id. 
 222. Id. at 1210; S. 3418, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (as amended November 21, 1974), reprinted in 
SOURCEBOOK, supra note 7, at 371; see also supra notes 123-125 and accompanying text. 
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statutory damage award requires proof of actual damages.  The relevant 
drafting and legislative history are how the $1,000 statutory minimum 
provision was included in the Privacy Act.223  The original version 
proposed by the Senate did not include the $1,000 statutory minimum 
language.224  In amending the Senate’s original version, the Senate 
included the $1,000 statutory minimum language which ultimately 
survived and was incorporated into the Privacy Act.225  What the 
majority overlooked is that the Senate had included the $1,000 statutory 
minimum language as a liquidated damage provision when amending the 
original Senate version of the privacy bill.226  No legislative history 
exists to dispute that this is not a liquidated damage provision in the 
current Privacy Act. 
Congress typically does not require proof of actual damages for 
plaintiffs to recover statutory liquidated damages.227  This is because a 
liquidated damage provision traditionally exists to specifically address 
the uncertainty and difficulty involved in proving actual damages.228  A 
liquidated damage provision is especially useful when real but intangible 
damages arise from violations.229  Because of the difficulty in assessing 
actual damages, a liquidated damages provision removes uncertainty by 
fixing a reasonable monetary sum.230  In other words, plaintiffs only 
need to prove that a breach or violation occurred, and proof of actual 
damages is unnecessary to recover liquidated damages.231 
 
 223. See Doe, 124 S. Ct. at 1209-10. 
 224. See supra note 122 and accompanying text. 
 225. Doe, 124 S. Ct. at 1209-10; S. 3418, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (as amended November 21, 
1974), reprinted in SOURCEBOOK, supra note 7, at 371. 
 226. 120 CONG. REC. 36,891 (1974), reprinted in SOURCEBOOK, supra note 7, at 768; see also 
supra note 125 and accompanying text.  The Senate explained the inclusion of $1,000 provision in 
its amended bill to allow “an individual . . . to recover . . . for liquidated damages of say $1,000 into 
the assessed against the agency for a violation of the Act.”  120 CONG. REC. 36,891 (1974), 
reprinted in SOURCEBOOK, supra note 7, at 768. 
 227. See e.g. Perrone v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 232 F.3d 433, 436 (5th Cir. 2000).  In 
interpreting the actual damage provision of the Consumer Leasing Act, the Fifth Circuit stated that 
statutory damage provision of the Consumer Leasing Act was meant to encourage private 
enforcement when no actual damages exist.  Id.  Additionally, statutory damages complement actual 
damage provision in the Consumer Leasing Act because statutory damages exist for cases where 
violations are small or difficult to ascertain.  Id.  See also Jeff Sovern, The Jewel of Their Souls; 
Preventing Identity Theft Through Loss Allocation Rules, 64 U. PITT L. REV. 343, 385 (2003) 
(stating that Fair Debt Collection Practices Act provides for statutory damages of up to $1,000 when 
consumers cannot establish actual damages). 
 228. ELAINE W. SHOBEN ET AL., REMEDIES 398-99 (3d ed. 2002). 
 229. DAN B. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES § 12.5, at 821 (1973). 
 230. SHOBEN, supra note 228, at 398. 
 231. See McCarthy v. Tally, 297 P.2d 981, 987 (Cal. 1956) (stating that plaintiffs only need to 
prove damage would have been difficult to ascertain at time of contract, agreed sum for damages 
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Thus, because Congress intended the Privacy Act’s civil remedy 
provision of $1,000 to be a liquidated damage provision,232 Congress 
never intended individuals to prove actual damages in order to recover 
the $1,000 statutory minimum.  Unfortunately, the majority missed the 
significance of the liquidated damage provision by focusing instead on 
the issue of presumed general damages.233  As a consequence, the Court 
obliterated the liquidated damage mechanism of the Privacy Act and 
established a statutory interpretation that will cause enforcement 
problems. 
B.  Effect of the Doe v. Chao Decision 
Doe v. Chao effectively dismantled the private enforcement 
mechanism of the Privacy Act.  As it stands, the private enforcement rate 
of the Privacy Act is already extremely low.  For the past 30 years, 
individuals have brought very few civil actions against government 
agencies.234  Without transparency of the government’s activities, 
individuals are simply unaware of their privacy rights and the existence 
of records kept by government agencies.235  Even if individuals were to 
bring lawsuits, plaintiffs must prove two required elements for recovery, 
an “intentional and willful” level of culpability and an “adverse effect” 
suffered by the individual.236  Courts have already construed both terms 
restrictively, creating barriers to recovery and discouraging individuals 
from bringing enforcement actions under the Privacy Act.237  By 
requiring proof of actual damages to recover the $1,000 statutory 
minimum, the Supreme Court raised the barriers created by lower courts 
 
was reasonable, and that breach occurred).  The California Supreme Court held that actual damage 
is not necessary to recover liquidated damage.  Id.  But see DOBBS, supra note 229, at 822 (noting 
that some cases held that plaintiffs must prove some actual damages but such cases are in the 
minority). 
 232. See supra note 226 and accompanying text. 
 233. See Doe, 124 S. Ct. at 1209-11. 
 234. See OFFICE OF INFORMATION AND PRIVACY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, FREEDOM OF 
INFORMATION CASE LIST 321-91 (1998) [hereinafter CASE LIST] (listing cases brought under the 
Privacy Act as of 1998); OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, FIFTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE 
PRESIDENT ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PRIVACY ACT OF 1974 14 (1979) [hereinafter 1979 
PRESIDENT REPORT] (stating that through 1978, only a few privacy litigations arose with 
approximately 40 suits being filed each year, and that in 1979 the number of cases increased to 
123); LODGE, supra note 78, at 633 n.132 (stating how the Department of Justice identified only 60 
reported cases brought under the Privacy Act that included damage claims as of 1983). 
 235. 1979 PRESIDENT REPORT, supra note 234, at 10. 
 236. Doe, 124 S.Ct. at 1219 n.5 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting), id. at 1221 (Breyer, J., dissenting); 
Lodge, supra note 78, at 632-33. 
 237. Doe, 124 S.Ct. at 1219 n.5 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting), id. at 1221 (Breyer, J., dissenting); 
Lodge, supra note 78, at 633. 
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to a formidable height, and in all likelihood, killed all enforcement 
incentives. 
C.  Need for Enforcement of the Privacy Act 
Congress included the civil remedy provision to encourage private 
enforcement of the Privacy Act.238  Recognizing that federal agencies 
have little incentives to enforce the Privacy Act,239 Congress intended to 
provide incentives for the “widest possible citizen enforcement.”240  The 
values of privacy traditionally included avoiding embarrassment, 
building intimacy, avoiding misuse, and encouraging innovation.241  
Today, individuals need even more privacy protection of information to 
protect valuable information such as an individual’s identity.  To do so, 
there must be a mechanism to enable the enforcement of the Privacy Act 
to guarantee such protection.  Unfortunately, Doe v. Chao effectively 
eradicates this mechanism for enforcement and has dealt a significant 
blow to the protection of private information in our society. 
1.  Lack of Incentives to Protect Privacy and Privacy Violations 
Our government, the largest collector of information, generally 
does not protect personal privacy and makes little efforts to follow the 
requirements of the Privacy Act.242 
In 1993, the U.S. General Accounting Office (the “GAO”) found 
that the FBI’s own audit revealed repeated misuse of the agency’s 
largest internal database, the National Crime Information Center.243  The 
GAO reported inconsistent compliance with the Privacy Act by 
government agencies, finding a compliance rate ranging from 100 
percent for some requirements to 70 percent for others.244  Additionally, 
 
 238. 120 CONG. REC. 36,892 (1974) (remarks of Sen. Ervin), reprinted in SOURCEBOOK, supra 
note 7, at 772; id. at 36,644 (remarks of Rep. Moorhead), reprinted in SOURCEBOOK, supra note 7, 
at 884. 
 239. Id. at 36,645 (remarks of Rep. Abzug), reprinted in SOURCEBOOK, supra note 7, at 887. 
 240. S. REP. NO. 93-1183, supra note 7, at 83, reprinted in SOURCEBOOK, supra note 7, at 236. 
 241. Kang, supra note 38, at 1212-14 (listing purposes and values of privacy as “avoiding 
embarrassment,” “constructing intimacy,” and “averting misuse”); Jay Weiser, Measure of 
Damages for Violation of Property Rules: Breach of Confidentiality, 9 U. CHI. L. SCH. 
ROUNDTABLE 75, 82 (2002) (discussing how privacy allows experimentation leading to new social 
developments). 
 242. Chlapowski, supra note 71, at 133-34. 
 243. Glenn R. Simpson, Big Brother-in-Law: If the FBI Hopes to Get the Goods on You, It 
May Ask ChoicePoint, WALL ST. J., Apr. 13, 2001, at A1. 
 244. UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PRIVACY ACT: OMB LEADERSHIP 
NEEDED TO IMPROVE AGENCY COMPLIANCE, GAO-03-304 at 14 (2003) [hereinafter GAO-03-304]. 
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today, where 70 percent of the agencies’ records contain electronic 
records245 and cybercrimes are expected to increase,246 the government’s 
computer-security efforts are so dismal that the House recently gave a 
“D-minus” grade.247 
It is no wonder that the government fails to vigilantly protect our 
privacy rights.  The OMB, the only central agency empowered by 
Congress to oversee implementation of the Privacy Act, devotes little 
resources and assigns low priority to Privacy Act compliance.248  
Because of the OMB’s lack of strong oversight, agencies in turn assign a 
low priority to Privacy Act compliance.249  Additionally, agencies 
maintaining public records view their primary responsibility in 
maintaining the integrity of records, not in protecting the privacy of 
individuals.250  Thus, if an agency maintaining public records receives 
documents with an individual’s social security number, the agency 
simply allows the entire document, with the social security number, to 
be available for public viewing.251  In sum, government agencies fail to 
protect personal privacy because they have no incentives to protect 
privacy, and no strong centralized enforcement agent exists to compel 
agencies to protect our privacy rights.252 
The government’s lax attitude toward safeguarding individuals’ 
right to privacy in personal information is especially disturbing today 
because the government collects voluminous amounts of personal 
information.253  In some instances, an agency maintains information on 
as many as 290 million people.254  For such a large number of people, 
 
 245. GAO-03-304, supra note 244, at 13. 
 246. See generally Thomas Fedorek, Computers + Connectivity = New Opportunities for 
Criminals and Delimmas for Investigators, 76 N.Y. ST. B.J. 10 (Feb. 2004) (discussing how the 
connectivity of computers create new opportunities for criminals, describing new types of 
cybercrimes, and predicting an increase in certain types of cybercrimes). 
 247. Simpson, supra note 243, at A1.  See also GAO-02-352, supra note 1, at 29-30 (reporting 
significant information security weaknesses and that federal agencies lack information security 
programs required by legislation). 
 248. GAO-03-304, supra note 244, at 26; Lynn Chuang Kramer, Comment, Private Eyes Are 
Watching You: Consumer Online Privacy Protection—Lessons From Home and Abroad, 37 TEX. 
INT’L L.J. 387, 414 (2002) (stating that the Office of Management and Budge had little interest in 
issuing guidelines on the Privacy Act). 
 249. GAO-03-304, supra note 244, at 26. 
 250. GAO-02-352, supra note 1, at 38. 
 251. Id. 
 252. Kramer, supra note 248, at 414. 
 253. UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, INFORMATION MANAGEMENT: 
SELECTED AGENCIES’ HANDLING OF PERSONAL INFORMATION, GAO-02-1058 at 17 (2002) 
[hereinafter GAO-02-1058]. 
 254. GAO-03-304, supra note 244, at 13.  The median number of people maintained in the 
system of records is about 3,500, but the number ranges from 5 people to 290 million people.  Id. 
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agencies collect (1) personal identifying information such as a social 
security number, the name, phone number, driver’s license number, 
address, and even e-mail address of an individual and (2) other non-
identifying information such as an individual’s birth date, physical 
description, occupation, net worth, criminal record, credit history, and 
salary.255  Of the information collected, agencies most often use the 
social security number to retrieve personal information256 because of the 
widespread use of the social security number as an accurate and reliable 
identifier for individuals.257 
The combination of the colossal amount of personal information 
and the lack of incentives to protect individuals’ privacy is causing 
abuse and violations of our right to privacy by the government.  In some 
instances, the government intentionally violates the right to privacy to 
profit from the sale of individuals’ personal information.258  For 
example, the United States Postal Service regularly sells information 
obtained from “change of address cards” to private companies, including 
credit reporting agencies and direct selling marketers.259  In other 
instances, government agencies simply share information with private 
 
 255. GAO-02-1058, supra note 253, at 19.  Agencies collect enormous amounts of personal 
information about an individual, his or her spouse, children, dependents, and parents.  Id.  The 
GAO, in its 2002 report, identified three types of information collected by certain agencies: personal 
identifiers, demographic data, and financial/legal data.  Id.  The personal identifier information 
includes the legal name, maiden name, aliases, home phone number, business phone number, social 
security number, driver’s license number, alien registration number, legal address, and e-mail 
address of an individual.  Id.  Demographic data includes the date of birth, place of birth, 
citizenship, marital status, date of marriage/divorce, number in household, education level, 
occupation, gender, and physical attributes such as height and eye color of an individual.  Id.  
Financial/legal data includes the salary, investments, net worth, credit history, child support, 
bankruptcy, criminal record, drug convictions, and litigations of an individual.  Id. 
 256. GAO-03-304, supra note 242, at 13.  Social security numbers are used for tax 
identification, employment records, law enforcement records, court records, driver records, child 
support records, professional licenses, student loans, and other uses such as veteran benefits.  Flavio 
L. Komuves, We’ve Got Your Number: An Overview of Legislation and Decisions to Control the 
Use of Social Security Numbers as Personal Identifiers, 16 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 
529, 540-49 (1998). 
 257. GAO-02-352, supra note 1, at 6.  President Franklin D. Roosevelt issued an Executive 
Order in 1943 that required all federal agencies to use social security numbers exclusively to 
identify individuals.  Id.  Thereafter, federal agencies and private entities dramatically increased 
their reliance on social security numbers as the primary identifying number for individuals.  Id. 
 258. Mark E. Budnitz, Privacy Protection for Consumer Transactions in Electronic 
Commerce: Why Self-Regulation is Inadequate, 49 S.C. L. REV. 847, 855 (1998) (discussing 
government violations of the right to privacy). 
 259. Budnitz, supra note 256, at 855-56 (stating that United States Postal Service receives 
$80,000 per year for the sale of information from change of address cards).  State governments also 
sell information to raise revenue for the states.  See id. at 855.  For example, Illinois receives $10 
million annually from the sale of public records.  Id. 
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companies without realizing that such actions are in violation of the 
Privacy Act.  For example, the state of Hawaii contracted a private 
company to issue speeding tickets using traffic cameras.260  To issue 
speeding tickets, however, Hawaiian state and city agencies gave the 
private company access to individuals’ driver’s license numbers, which 
also happen to be the individuals’ social security numbers.261  The access 
constituted a violation of the Privacy Act because agencies must disclose 
all intended uses of the social security numbers to individuals at the time 
agencies obtain the information from the individuals.262  At other times, 
government agencies intentionally take actions that violate the spirit of 
the Privacy Act, but are not technically violations of the Privacy Act.263  
For example, the FBI, IRS, and numerous federal agencies currently 
purchase millions of dollars worth of personal data from private 
companies that provide commercial look-up services.264  These 
commercial companies specialize in what government agencies cannot 
do — glean, sort, and organize data on individuals to compile a master 
information file.265  By indexing and matching information from various 
sources, private companies collect credit information, names, aliases, 
addresses, motor-vehicle information, real property records, traffic 
records, bankruptcy filings, and other information under an individual’s 
social security number.266  Although Congress enacted the Privacy Act 
to prevent federal agencies from gathering data irrelevant for agencies’ 
purposes, federal agencies circumvent the Privacy Act by employing 
private companies to gather extraneous data.267 
2.  Government’s Privacy Violation: An Invitation for Identity 
Theft 
Today, where information is a valuable commodity, government 
 
 260. Mike Leidemann, Lawsuit Targets Camera Tickets, HONOLULU ADVERT., April 3, 2002, 
available at 2002 WL 24193802; ACLU Sues State Over Traffic Camera Vans for Violating Privacy 
Laws, A.P. Wires, April 2, 2002 [hereinafter AP WIRE 2002].  
 261. Leidemann, supra note 258; AP WIRE 2002, supra note 258. 
 262. The Privacy Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-579, § 7, 88 Stat 1896 (1974); Leidemann, supra 
note 258. 
 263. Glenn R. Simpson, U.S. Agencies Tap Outside Data Source, WALL ST. J., April 13, 2001, 
at A1, available at 2001 WL-WSJ 2860297 (discussing government agencies’ intentional actions 
which violate the Privacy Act). 
 264. Simpson, supra note 261, at A1.  The Justice Department paid $8,000,000 to buy data 
from ChoicePoint in 2000, and the IRS signed a multiyear contract worth up to $12,000,000 with 
ChoicePoint.  Id.  ChoicePoint alone has at least 35 federal agencies as customers.  Id. 
 265. Id. 
 266. Id. 
 267. Id. 
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agencies’ violation of the Privacy Act, especially the unlawful disclosure 
of social security numbers, will increase social and economic harm to 
individuals. 268  Like it or not, the social security number is the universal 
identifier for individuals.269  Because of the widespread use of the social 
security number as an identifier by the government and private 
companies, individuals’ complete financial, medical, credit, and other 
vital information is linked to the social security number.270  Not 
surprisingly, the social security number is also the key information 
stolen and used by identity thieves to commit identity theft.271 
Identity theft is rising each year,272 and the total cost associated 
with identity theft reported in year 2002 alone is staggering — 
approximately $47.6 billion to businesses and $5.0 billion to 
individuals.273  However, of the approximately 27 million Americans 
affected by identity theft during the period of 1998-2003,274 most victims 
did not incur out-of-pocket losses.275  Instead, most victims suffered 
significant non-monetary harm.  Victims generally attribute a significant 
loss of time spent on resolving problems caused by identity theft as the 
most common non-monetary harm, with figures ranging anywhere from 
an average of 30 hours to 600 hours.276  Problems range from bounced 
 
 268. Mell, supra note 20, at 12-13 (stating that information has become a valuable commodity 
instead of ancillary resource). 
 269. See Daniel J. Solove, Identity Theft, Privacy, and the Architecture of Vulnerability, 54 
HASTINGS L.J. 1227, 1253 (2003) (stating that the social security number is a de facto identifier). 
 270. GAO-02-352, supra note 1, at 3-8; Solove, supra note 267, at 1252-54. 
 271. GAO-02-352, supra note 1, at 9; Solove, supra note 267, at 1252.  With the social 
security number, a person can “open and close accounts, change addresses, obtain loans, access 
personal information, make financial transactions, and more.”  Solove, supra note 267, at 1253. 
 272. See CONSUMER SENTINEL, IDENTITY THEFT DATA CLEARINGHOUSE, FEDERAL TRADE 
COMM’N, NATIONAL AND STATE TRENDS IN FRAUD & IDENTITY THEFT: JANUARY – DECEMBER 
2003 3-4 (2004) (stating that complaints received by Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) increased 
from 2002) [hereinafter FTC 2004 REPORT]; Synovate, Federal Trade Comm’n, Federal Trade 
Commission – Identity Theft Survey Report 18 (2003) (stating that identity theft crimes are on the 
rise, and identity theft report increased 41% from 2002) [hereinafter FTC 2003 SURVEY]; UNITED 
STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, IDENTITY THEFT: PREVALENCE AND COST APPEAR TO BE 
GROWING, GAO-02-363 at 4 (2002) (indicating increase in identity theft alerts received by 
consumer reporting agencies) [hereinafter GAO-02-363]. 
 273. FTC 2003 SURVEY, supra note 270, at 7. 
 274. Id. at 12. 
 275. Id. at 43.  Approximately 63% of the victims incurred no monetary losses.  Id. 
 276. LINDA & JAY FOLEY, IDENTITY THEFT RESOURCE CENTER, IDENTITY THEFT: THE 
AFTERMATH 2003, A COMPREHENSIVE STUDY TO UNDERSTAND THE IMPACT OF IDENTITY THEFT 
ON KNOWN VICTIMS 24 (2003), available at http://www.idtheftcenter.org/idaftermath.pdf (last 
visited Oct. 10, 2004) [hereinafter ID RESOURCE 2003 STUDY]; FTC 2003 SURVEY, supra note 270, 
at 7.  The figures on the number of hours spent by victims vary by reports and surveys.  The FTC 
reported victims spent approximately 297 million total hours, with an average of 30 hours per 
victim in 2002.  FTC 2003 SURVEY, supra note 270, at 7.  The Identity Theft Resource Center 
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checks, loan denials, credit card application rejections, debt collection 
harassment, insurance rejections, and the shut down of utilities.277  
Victims can also be mistaken as the subject of civil lawsuits or criminal 
investigations, arrests, or convictions.278  Given the severity of these 
non-monetary problems, victims are clearly justified in feeling 
personally violated and suffering from severe emotional distress.279  In 
fact, such non-monetary harm, although difficult to quantify, may cause 
more damage to identity theft victims than quantifiable monetary loss.280  
Unfortunately, identity theft will likely increase over the years with the 
growth of online technologies281 because a majority of government 
agencies use electronic records containing the social security number. 282  
Such records are generally stored and processed in computers that are 
linked to other computers.283 
The government’s illegal or careless disclosure of the social 
security number to third parties, for any reason, is similar to leaving 
one’s front door wide open – inviting thieves to steal.  Because of 
limited resources and the difficulty in tracing identity thieves, law 
enforcement rarely catches identity thieves.284  This problem is 
compounded because most identity theft victims do not find out that 
their identities have been stolen until long after the theft has begun.285  
 
surveyed a group of known identity theft victims and found victims spent an average of 600 hours.  
ID RESOURCE 2003 STUDY at 24. 
 277. GAO-02-363, supra note 270, at 9; FTC 2003 SURVEY, supra note 270, at 47-48. 
 278. GAO-02-363, supra note 270, at 9; FTC 2003 SURVEY, supra note 270, at 47-48. 
 279. See GAO-02-363, supra note 270, at 9 (stating that victims often feel “personally 
violated” and may potentially suffer severe emotional harm). 
 280. See ID RESOURCE 2003 STUDY, supra note 274, at 35 (stating that victim’s sense of 
frustration, anger, insecurity, and helplessness linger over time and such psychological impacts may 
have far worse consequences for victims than financial costs). 
 281. GAO-02-363, supra note 270, at 13; Harry A. Valetk, Mastering the Dark Arts of 
Cyberspace: A Quest for Sound Internet Safety Policies, 2004 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 2, 11 (2004). 
 282. GAO-02-352, supra note 1, at 27 (stating how 90 percent of the surveyed agencies use 
both hard and electronic records containing the social security numbers to conduct activities, and 
that many employ computers linked to computer networks when using electronic records). 
 283. Id. 
 284. See UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, IDENTITY THEFT: GREATER 
AWARENESS AND USE OF EXISTING DATA ARE NEEDED, GAO-02-766 17-18 (2002) (finding that 
law enforcement agencies have insufficient resources to investigate and prosecute and that identity 
theft cases often end without an arrest) [hereinafter GAO-02-766].  It also does not help that 
because of longer than usual efforts needed to solve identity theft crimes and relatively minimal 
punishment even if successful, law enforcements have no incentives to vigorously pursue identity 
theft crimes.  Id.  One survey found that the chance of catching an identity thief is only one in 700.  
How Many Identity Theft Victims Are There? What IS the Impact on Victims?, Privacy Rights 
Clearinghouse (2003), available at http://www.privacyrights.org/ar/idtheftsurveys.htm (posted 
September 8, 2003 and last visited May 8, 2004). 
 285. Solove, supra note 267, at 1248.  Victims usually learn of the identity theft about one year 
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Thus, at the present time, safeguarding the social security number and 
other identifying information to prevent identity theft is more effective 
than relying on law enforcement to catch identity thieves.  Therefore, 
government agencies must take stringent proactive measures, now more 
than ever, to protect the privacy of individuals’ personal information. 
3.  The Importance of Private Enforcement of the Privacy Act 
To do so, government agencies should follow the Privacy Act and 
the guidelines of the Privacy Act more vigorously.  Unfortunately, given 
the government’s lack of incentives and the low priority on protecting 
the right of privacy, the Privacy Act is only effective if government 
agencies are compelled to follow it.  To prevent substantial harm, such 
as identity theft, individuals must be able to bring actions to enforce the 
government’s protection of individuals’ informational privacy before 
substantial damages arise.  By swiftly bringing actions when illegal 
disclosures initially occur and forcing the government to pay the 
statutory minimum damage amount, individuals can compel government 
agencies to protect privacy more effectively and proactively. 
Individuals are appropriate enforcers of the Privacy Act because 
individuals have more at stake.  As discussed above, if the government 
fails to comply with the Privacy Act, individuals, not the government, 
suffer the consequence.  Thus, it makes sense to give incentives for 
individuals to shoulder the responsibility of monitoring government 
activities and in bringing actions against the government to enforce the 
Privacy Act.  With the Doe v. Chao decision, however, individuals have 
little to no incentive to bring actions to compel government agencies to 
follow the Privacy Act before individuals incur substantial harm.  With 
no incentives to bring actions, the private enforcement mechanism of the 
Privacy Act is effectively eliminated. 
D.  Legislative Recommendation 
Congress must once again act to ensure the protection of 
individuals’ privacy by giving incentives for individuals to bring civil 
actions against the government.  At a minimum, Congress should amend 
the civil damages provision to clarify that individuals need not prove 
actual damages to recover the statutory minimum damage.  For private 
enforcement to be truly effective, however, Congress should amend the 
damages provision to do more. 
 
after such occurrence.  Id. 
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Congress feared exorbitant costs and liability stemming from the 
enforcement of the Privacy Act, but such fears never materialized.286  
Before the Privacy Act passed, the OMB estimated a total of $300-$400 
million to implement the Privacy Act in 1974.287  The actual cost of 
implementation in the first year proved to be substantially less – 
approximately $66 million.288  Additionally, the private enforcement rate 
for the last 30 years has been low.289  Given the significant consequences 
that can arise from violations under the Privacy Act and the relatively 
low liability incurred by the government to date, Congress should 
increase the amount of recoverable damages. 
Congress should increase the measure of damages in three ways.  
First, the minimum statutory liquidated damages should be increased 
from $1,000 to $10,000.  The increased statutory minimum damage 
amount is substantial enough to deter the government from violating the 
right to privacy and to encourage individuals to monitor and sue the 
government for violations of the Privacy Act.  Second, the damage 
provision should include presumed general damages.  The presumed 
general damage doctrine, an exception in tort law, has been justified in 
areas of law when certainty of injury and difficulty of proving such 
injury exist.290  Emotional damages individuals suffer and the difficulty 
of proving such injury from the government’s privacy violation certainly 
justify inclusion of presumed general damages in the damages provision 
of the Privacy Act.  Lastly, Congress should add a punitive damages 
provision for repeated or continued violations by agencies to encourage 
the government to immediately rectify violations.  The punitive damage 
provision would not apply to any first time violation by the government.  
By only penalizing the government for repeated or continued violations, 
the government would not be exposed to astronomical liability.  
However, punitive damages will deter agencies from ignoring or 
assigning low priorities to privacy violations. 
The increased measure of damages as recommended above will 
provide the proper incentives for individuals to bring actions to enforce 
the Privacy Act.  However, the recommended measure of damages 
should only be awarded once an individual proves an “adverse effect” to 
 
 286. Doe v. Chao, 124 S.Ct. 1204, 1217-18 (2004) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (pointing out that 
courts have not allowed class certification and runaway liability and that government has not 
experienced enormous recoveries). 
 287. PERSONAL PRIVACY, supra note 6, at 500. 
 288. Id. 
 289. See supra notes 232-235 and accompanying text (discussing low private enforcement rate 
and factors contributing to low private enforcement rate). 
 290. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 760 (1985). 
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the individual and an “intentional and willful” level of culpability by the 
government.  Since courts’ restrictive interpretations made these 
elements difficult to prove, individuals would be deterred from bringing 
frivolous lawsuits.  Therefore, the increased measure of damages would 
allow individuals to recover only for meritorious actions. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Informational privacy is vital in today’s society.  The Privacy Act 
of 1974 attempts to protect individuals’ privacy from governmental 
intrusions.  The effectiveness of the Privacy Act, however, lies in the 
ability of individuals to bring enforcement actions against the 
government.  Unfortunately, the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Doe 
v. Chao obliterates the incentives necessary for individuals to bring 
enforcement actions against the government under the Privacy Act.  
Therefore, Congress should once again take legislative action to provide 
incentives for individuals to compel the government’s compliance with 
safeguarding individuals’ rights to privacy and to effectuate the Privacy 
Act. 
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